Crisis, Crime, Crime Control and Criminology

Criminology in Spain
THE EUROPEAN CRISIS AND CRIMINOLOGY

The European crisis is an economic and political crisis. As such it concerns us as citizens. As criminologists it could, however, present us with opportunities for research. The crisis will potentially influence both crime and reactions to crime.

Central to the European crisis are the high unemployment figures. Unemployment and as a result, poverty, are classic criminological explanations to crime. Will there be an increase in different types of property crimes? Problematic drug use has been shown by criminologists to be associated with both individual poverty and poor areas in larger cities. Can we expect an increase in problematic drug use and with that of traditional crime?

An integrated Europe allows for the free movement of people between EU countries. Will decreases in income and unemployment result in more or in less forced labour migration within Europe and will this lead to problems and tensions in the target countries?

Will different types of cross-border crime be seen as an alternative source of income when legal alternatives become scarcer? Or less dramatically, will the black labour market expand thereby decreasing state revenues for different purposes? And will the crisis affect the extensive frauds on EU subsidies?

An increase in crime is, however, not a necessary effect of the crisis. Psychologically, citizens might experience a particularly hard pressure to obey and not to cut corners when they have to line up for jobs, or even for the soup kitchen. And the controls might tighten including increases in segregation.

The reactions of the state to the crisis in terms of criminal policy are of course not least interesting for criminology. These reactions can take
place in relation to both real and imaginary threats of crime. Will the crisis result in changes in the Schengen Agreement and the regulation on Europol or will there be changes in their implementations?

The EU member states have become weakened both as a result of delegating powers to the EU and of the EU not being able to cope with the crisis. Will crime give an opportunity for the states to strengthen the legitimacy of individual states? Will different types of crime and particularly the amorphous organised crime become means for states to demonstrate its strength and independence? Will this manifest itself in strong talk and symbolic legislation?

Moreover, when it comes to the reactions towards crime there might be a pressure towards less rather than more. Will the states have enough resources to expand the criminal justice system or could the crisis even result in a trend towards decarceration?

An effect of the crisis is the evolution of populist parties into dominant political forces in several European countries, in some of them only taking a couple of years to arrive from the fringes at the heart of the political system. A central element of the narrative of these parties is a strong anti-minority rhetoric and a demand for harsh anti-immigration policies. The demand for law and order is an equally crucial message. Usually the two issues are regarded as one as immigrants and minorities are seen as being responsible for the alleged increase in crime. Why are those two phenomenon necessarily connected in the tradition of extreme right populism? And is the questioning of this association the reason why criminologists are generally disliked by the populist parties?

Another question is whether the criminal policies proposed by the populist parties in Europe are exclusively of their own or have they been increasingly co-opted by the mainstream parties? A punitive turn in criminal policy among major political parties has been reported from several European countries. And if populist parties and issues of law and order have gained momentum, the question ‘Why?’ has to be raised. What role does the increasing inequality, the growing sense of decreased unity and Gemeinschaft play in these major shifts of the political landscape and policy discourses?

The scientific questions raised by the European crisis are of interest to us criminologists. It could be seen as a natural experiment — before and after the crisis. Depending on their differing development and distinct strategies to deal with the crisis, European states could also be compared to each other. The changes, of course, could not be sharply located in time. It took years for them to develop. A perhaps similar but more sharply defined historic change is that of the fall of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. The development of crime, before and after the fall of the Iron Curtain provided criminologists a unique opportunity to study sudden social change in real time, and develop a new conceptual framework for social change — as those favoured during stable times proved to be not sufficiently explanatory. An abrupt change in Iceland was the banking crisis. Icelandic criminologists and other scientists took the opportunity and studied its effect on crime. The report, which also includes other historic examples, was given the name When the Unforeseen is Seen. One conclusion is that crime and crises tend to go together.

What can be seen by criminologists from the present move from the European Union to the European Crisis?

Henrik Tham is a professor of criminology at Stockholm University and the President of the ESC.

FROM THE NEXT ISSUES

› Helgi Gunnlaugsson on crime and social change in the post-crisis Iceland
› Wim Huisman on the crisis and challenges of white collar crime research in Europe
› Susanne Karstedt on crisis, neoliberalism and declining imprisonment rates
What should criminologists see in the present European crisis? — asks Henrik Tham in his presidential message. He urges us, just like his predecessor, Miklós Lévay — quoting Joanna Shapland — before him¹, to learn from criminology’s omissions and refocus our attention to issues brought up by the crisis.

In other disciplines, reorientation is clearly visible. In economics, for example, the calamities starting in 2008 caused a full-fledged epistemological crisis². It seems that mainstream economics missed the origins of the crisis, failed to appreciate its worst symptoms, and now it disagrees about the remedies. There is even disagreement about the origins and symptoms in hindsight. The rise of behavioural economics, the return of political economy: these are all signs of a reorientation.

No such sombre mood can be detected in criminology. But why would we say the criminologists have missed something? Most economists clearly did. But criminologists? Why would be a similar refocusing of criminology’s attention needed? So far, crime rates do not seem to have moved significantly, and the time span since the beginning of the crisis is far too short anyway to draw definitive conclusions; more importantly, in most European countries, no dramatic changes have taken place, truly radical transformations of economies, political and legal systems or welfare regimes, if any, are yet to happen. The existing theoretical frameworks respective approaches apply seem satisfactory.

But is that really so?

One field where the relative lack of attention is clearly visible is white collar crime. Criminology might not yet be entirely equipped with the theoretical tools with which the fine line between legal and illegal on, for example, the capital markets can be described. Research into causation in the field of financial or corporate crime is also scarce. The same applies to the reaction to these crimes: how financial regulation comes about, how institutional and interpretative practices of regulatory authorities, law enforcement agencies, and the courts shape our understanding about what is criminal on the financial markets and what is not. Despite some existing and truly innovative projects, research on the (both global and local) political economy and the social context of regulation and law enforcement practices in financial and corporate crime are also yet to find their way onto the agenda of European criminology.

The financial crisis is not an American phenomenon: it would be complacent to think that it was caused by Wall Street gone berserk with European financial institutions conveniently filling the role of innocent victims. It might be a logical mistake to suggest that the fact that — when it comes to the crisis — we seem to talk more about white collar crime, regulation and enforcement in the US means that no similar phenomena exist in Europe.³

But that is not the only field that might need further attention. Henrik Tham lists many in his presidential message: the effects of growing inequalities and persistent unemployment; the implications of austerity measures on crime control; the rise of extremist political parties, and, at least some countries, the institutionalisation of organised political violence; harsh anti-immigration and law and order policies that seem increasingly becoming the political mainstream. Miklós Lévay, in his message (written in the summer of 2011, the London riots still a fresh experience) mentions riots and urban violence.

Are these all connected to the European crisis? We don’t know. But it is clear that we are witnessing the realignment of the political economies in Europe, and also that of the European political economy. The consequences of this are visible in many countries. Some, like Iceland, has already experienced a social crisis that, as Henrik Tham points out, might be comparable to the Eastern European transitions, and are now groping

² Nothing embodies this epistemological crisis better than a 2008 cover of the The Economist, otherwise not exactly a vanguard of critical economic thinking, which showed a book titled ‘Modern Economic Theory’ melting away in the sunshine.
³ Indeed: the difference between American regulatory and enforcement mechanisms and those of the EU and European nation states might also be a legitimate subject of comparative criminological research.
with its aftermath; others, like Greece or Spain, are still coping with the ongoing crisis. Welfare regimes are facing or are already undergoing radical changes in most European countries.

Many of these developments are still too close to make conclusions as to whether they are effecting, or will effect, crime and crime control in Europe. Some connection might be clearer.

In our Crisis, Crime, Crime Control and Criminology series in the 2012 issues we would like to address these topics. The Newsletter offers a more informal setting, and as such, is well fit to explore new ideas, test correlations, and contemplate new research directions. Submissions are welcome!

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Econometric studies by criminologists in Britain and the United States have repeatedly shown that adverse economic conditions, from unemployment and poverty to income inequality and a sense of relative deprivation, are linked to a growth in crime, especially in property and violent offences. There exist various and often tangled explanations as to how economic factors impact upon levels and patterns of crime. Unemployment, for example, is thought to strengthen the temptation to commit offences, but also to enhance the emergence of other positive correlates of crime such as lack of education and housing. It might thus be reasonable to assume that the ‘credit crunch’ of the late 2000s has fuelled a significant rise in property and violent crime on either side of the Atlantic. Available empirical evidence, however, suggests that the long-term trend of falling crime rates in the cases of Britain and the US has not undergone a reversal.

The relationship between economic recession, on the one hand, and levels and patterns of crime, on the other hand, has yet to receive sufficient criminological attention in the context of non-Anglophone jurisdictions (but see also Rodriguez and Larrauri, this issue), even though a broader international comparative analysis would seem necessary in order to better test this relationship. This brief commentary focuses on Greece, a country that has in recent years found itself in the midst of a deep economic crisis. The Greek experience reveals that the economic downturn may be associated, in varying degrees, with a wider range of criminal behaviours than is typically acknowledged. It also illustrates that, just as politics has shaped the financial crisis itself, so too it has infused perceptions of the connection between the crisis and crime.

**FINANCIAL CRISIS IN GREECE**

In 2009, the OECD reported that Greece had proved to be better insulated than many of its fellow OECD member-states from the global financial crisis that had been triggered by the US sub-prime mortgage crisis of 2007. Within the space of a few short months, however, the revelation of Greece’s own domestic financial crisis saw the country newly assessed as a major risk to the financial health of both its European counterparts and the broader international environment. Whilst all European economies were suffering from the reduction in liquidity caused by the global downturn, the emerging sovereign debt crisis of Eurozone member-states was proving to be most severely experienced in Greece. In response to Greece’s admission in November 2009 that it was facing unmanageable levels of public debt, a succession of bailout packages were engineered by the Troika — the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund — each of which provided loans to Greece with the condition that the country implement...
a wide array of austerity measures, from spending cuts and public sector lay-offs to tax rises and the privatisation of public assets. Whilst subsequent assessments of the effectiveness of the Greek state in imposing such measures and thereby lowering the deficit have been mixed, there has been little sign of equivocation in judgements of the social impact of the measures.

Even before the crisis, Greece had persistently manifested one of the highest levels of income inequality and poverty in Europe. With the imposition of austerity came surging levels of unemployment, which rose from 6.6% in May 2008 to over 21% by March 2012. Living standards dropped, falling particularly sharply from late 2010 onwards (as evident, for example, from surveys of gross disposable household income and material deprivation). If income losses have been larger for wealthier proportions of the population in absolute terms, poorer groups have still suffered disproportionately from a significant drop of income. Relatedly, then, there has been a dramatic rise in negative health outcomes (such as elevated rates of suicide) caused by cuts to health and welfare spending and the intensification of a gamut of socio-economic pressures on families and individuals (see, e.g., Kentikelenis et al., 2011).

Despite the commonplace inclination of political, media and scholarly commentators to reflect on the relationship between this litany of harmful developments and the ‘problem of crime’ through the narrow prism of property and violent interpersonal offences, we suggest that the relationship between crime and financial maelstrom in contemporary Greece is more clearly and accurately addressed from a broader perspective that additionally includes consideration of corruption and organised political violence.

**CORRUPTION**

As the vast majority of domestic and international observers of the Greek crisis have reported, corruption has been a key factor contributing to the emergence of the country’s financial crisis, organically related to over-expenditure and mismanagement of public funds. Successive scandals have illustrated, for example, the major role played by clientelist logics in determining the awarding of state contracts to civil and defence projects that are often of questionable merit (defence contracts being particularly significant for a country that has consistently spent one of the highest proportions of its GDP amongst NATO allies on defence). Clientelist forms of corruption have also lain behind the repeated provision of ad hoc exemptions and post hoc legalisation to unfair and illegal practices (such as the regular pre-election wave of legalisations granted to illegally renovated and constructed properties), and in the routine support for unnecessary and under-qualified public sector appointments.

The two political parties that alternately dominated government over the past thirty years (PASOK, on the centre-left, and New Democracy, on the centre-right) have readily resorted to the argument that all levels of society are to blame for the crisis, although emphasising the responsibility of civil servants and the general public for colluding in practices of patronage and petty corruption. This argument has done little to mollify public frustration with patterns of grand corruption in which political, media and business elites have incessantly been implicated. Such frustrations have long stood at a very high level by European comparison, but they saw intensification following the onset of the crisis, and have increasingly turned to anger. Indeed, in combination with vocal criticism from foreign observers, the exasperation of the domestic public has placed significant pressure on Greek politicians to put a halt to treating elite corruption with impunity. Unfortunately this has been pressure which they have proved overwhelmingly able to resist; notwithstanding the indictment of a former Minister of Defence in 2012, members of parliament displayed remarkable audacity when in 2011 they absolved themselves of any responsibility for the two largest cases of corruption to rock Greek political life in recent years: the Vatopedi and Siemens scandals. Both of these implicated members of PASOK and New Democracy, and concerned, respectively, a monastery land-swap arrangement, and security systems and telecommunications contracts (see further Xenakis, 2011).

To understand just why it is that mainstream politicians in Greece have remained so willing to maintain impunity towards elite corruption, given not only its role in generating the current crisis, but also the fact that public animosity has grown to such levels that politicians from PASOK and New Democracy have become unable to appear in public without risk of assault, it is necessary to acknowledge the way in which elite corruption has long functioned as a prerequisite to the maintenance of elite consent to the political status quo in the country. Moreover, an appreciation of the significance of elite corruption within Greek public life today is key to recognising the political imperatives of shifting public attention instead to the risks of property and violent crime.
PROPERTY AND VIOLENT CRIME

In the wake of the recent and ongoing financial crisis in Greece, public fears about property and violent crime appear to have risen dramatically, often in association with heightened concerns about illegal immigration into the country, as well as drug abuse and related offending. These sentiments have been fuelled in no small part by political, media and scholarly discourse that cites police-recorded crime statistics showing a significant growth in thefts, burglaries and robberies over this time span. Between 2009 and 2011, for example, the total annual volume of burglaries and thefts rose by 33%, from 72,658 to 96,925, whilst the respective volume of robberies increased by 41%, from 4,708 to 6,636. Amongst offenders known to the police, Greeks were responsible for the majority of burglaries and thefts, but non-Greeks were over-represented in proportion to their share of the general population. As far as robberies are concerned, however, non-Greeks were both the majority of known offenders and were again proportionately over-represented.

Alas, such data have helped to retrospectively justify what have been longstanding trends of disproportionately high levels of public fear of criminal victimisation, but also of public support for the harsh punishment of common offenders, especially of immigrant origin, as this has been practiced by the Greek state for decades now and has intensified more recently. Indeed, over the three decades that preceded the crisis, Greece became one of the most crime-fearing and punitive nations in Europe and beyond, even though police-recorded crime rates in the country were low by European comparison, rose only modestly, and most of this rise was due to offences of little criminological interest (e.g., traffic offences such as speeding and illegal parking) (see further Cheliotis & Xenakis, 2010, 2011).

It is plausible that levels and patterns of public fear of crime, as well as of punitiveness, still remain incommensurate to the actual levels and patterns of criminal victimisation. For instance, the occurrence of certain types of violent crime has fallen since the onset of the financial crisis, whilst the percentile rise in the occurrence of other types of violent crime is far less impressive when expressed in terms of absolute numbers and compared to the pre-crisis period. Thus, between 2009 and 2011, the total annual volume of police-recorded rapes decreased by 20%, from 214 to 172, whilst the 29% growth in the respective volume of homicides, from 143 to 184, did not exceed the peak rate experienced in recent decades. Also, the participation of Greeks in thefts and burglaries has risen much more starkly since 2009 than that of non-Greeks, whilst non-Greek participation in robberies actually shrank between 2010 and 2011.

In any case, there are multiple reasons why police-recorded crime statistics in Greece need to be treated with particular caution when used as a proxy for actual crime rates. These range from the reported ease with which the Greek police file unwarranted charges, to their systematic over-policing of immigrant communities (including so-called ‘sweep’ or ‘cleaning’ operations and a propensity to stop-search and arrest immigrant individuals to a greater degree than Greek persons), to the tendency of Greek citizens to report crimes to police authorities even when cases are frivolous and their specifics largely uncertain, just as they are more likely to report crimes when offenders are believed to be immigrants (ibid.). At least some of these pitfalls could be overcome by comparing police-recorded data against prosecutorial and judicial data for the same period, but the Ministry of Justice has not publicised prosecutorial and judicial data since 2009; the year that it was renamed the Ministry of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights.

ORGANISED POLITICAL VIOLENCE BY SUB-STATE GROUPS

Perhaps the most dramatic concern expressed by domestic and international commentators about the relationship between economic downturn and law-breaking in Greece has related to political violence perpetrated by sub-state groups. This apprehension has not been surprising, given that less than a year before the crisis broke the country had experienced its worst social unrest for decades. There had also been a significant re-emergence of politically violent organisations since the mid-2000s. Moreover, within a year of the economic crisis erupting, an incident in which a mass protest against austerity coincided with organised political violence produced three civilian fatalities (Xenakis, 2012). The most melodramatic prognoses about the impact of the crisis in fuelling political violence have, nevertheless, not yet been realised; not, at least, from the quarters most expected: organised covert groups identified as anarchists and far-leftists that are willing to use violence in support of their political campaigning.

Following a series of arrests in 2010, during the very time frame in which the impact of the crisis was increasingly being felt by Greek society and by the
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youth in particular, political violence from sub-state covert groups to the far-left of the political spectrum radically diminished. Equally, by summer 2012, there had been no repeat of social disorder that matched the month-long unrest of December 2008. On the other hand, covertly organised political violence by the far-right continued the ascent it had begun over the 2000s. By the late 2000s, far-right groups were already bold enough to patrol immigrant-dense districts of Athens in platoon-like formations of around thirty to forty black-clad and capped individuals armed with sticks, and to engage in violent assaults against immigrants and their property in broad daylight (on occasion, also, to do so in front of the police). Mirroring the reluctance of the Greek state to prosecute or monitor racist violence or racially-motivated crimes, far-right violence has commonly been neglected by political, media and scholarly commentators on political violence in Greece. It was only the success of the fascistic far-right party Chrysi Avgi ("Golden Dawn") in the general election of May 2012 and their ensuing entry to parliament which catapulted organised political violence by far-right groups into the mainstream political spotlight. Even so, a notable degree of ambivalence towards organised violence by the far-right has remained apparent in public discourse, reflecting the breadth of public support that far-right sentiments have gained over recent years. This is a development that has been sustained not only by the exacerbation of domestic socio-economic tensions over the same period, but also by the opportunism of PASOK and New Democracy to exploit xenophobia, and anti-immigrant attitudes more particularly, in their efforts to distract attention from public discontent about the role these parties have played in fomenting financial crisis and in inequitably distributing its negative ramifications upon the citizenry (ibid.).

CONCLUDING REMARKS
As suggested by this brief review, the relationship between crime and the financial crisis in Greece has been non-linear, irregular, and complex. Core concerns about the impact of economic upheaval upon Greek society have encompassed dimensions of lawbreaking that go beyond property and violent crime, without, however, treating them as part of the ‘crime problem’. Furthermore, there are important connections between corruption, property and violent crime, and organised political violence, with the crisis playing a central part in bringing these to the fore. Equally, the linkages between such forms of illegality have been highly politicised, and recognition of this point is vital to avoid analytical entrapment in narrow terms of reference that serve to convenience particular political constituencies. To account specifically for the intensified preoccupation with property and violent offences in recent years in Greece, three factors are of paramount importance: first, that the financial crisis has had a role in fuelling a rise in at least some of these offences; second, that against the backdrop of the crisis, mounting experience of state impunity towards grand corruption scandals has strengthened the need for political elites to divert public attention towards property and violent offences (particularly towards offences attributable to weak minorities); and third, that this imperative has become all the more pressing given the constraints posed by the crisis on the use of clientelism, itself another long-standing means of assuaging socio-economic strains amongst the public.


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A juxtaposition of economic crisis and crime immediately raises several criminological hypotheses. They include: a contracting economy might increase property and violent crime (Rosenfeld 2009); higher unemployment rates might lead to more crime (Chiricos 1987; Sutton 2004); greater inequality might lead to more violent crime (Vold, Bernard and Snipes 2002); or low level of social welfare investment might lead to more imprisonment (Downes and Hansen 2006; Savage et al. 2008). In this brief survey, we will try to provide some data and thoughts about these hypotheses. We describe trends in crime and imprisonment rates, and in perceptions of insecurity in Spain before and after the beginning of the current economic crisis in 2008. For each trend, we also include a brief discussion about the differences between the two periods.

**DID CRIME IN THE STREETS INCREASE WITH THE ECONOMIC CRISIS?**

National crime statistics in Spain are notoriously unreliable (Aebi and Linde 2010) due to lack of empirical and democratic traditions and, more recently, to the uneven process of state decentralisation experienced by the country in the last decades, which has generated multiple sources of conflicting and overlapping data. The most reliable data show that, contrary to expectations, the overall crime rate has declined since the beginning of 2008, apparently following a downwards trend that started in 2002. As Chart 1 shows, the predicted crime rates fit almost perfectly the observed ones and are well within the 95% prediction interval. However, it is possible that some crimes (e.g., some property crimes) may have increased, and others (e.g., violent crimes) decreased, as a consequence of the economic downturn, contradicting recent research that suggests both types of crimes are correlated and should move in a similar direction during economic slumps (Rosenfeld 2009). We analyse this possibility in Table 1, which distinguishes felony rates (i.e., excluding misdemeanours) by type and year.

The last two columns in Table 1 show the percentage change in the rates for each category of felonies in the 3-year period before the beginning of the economic crisis and the 3-year period of the recession for which we have data. A comparison of these two columns helps visualise if there was any change in trends. There was, but generally in the opposite direction as

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**Chart 1: Criminal Offences and Jailed Population**

Source: own elaboration from data published in the “Anuario Estadístico del Ministerio del Interior 2010”.

* per 1,000 adults; ** per 100,000 adults

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*We thank David Puig for his analysis; Marti Rovira for his research assistance; Daniel Varona for discussion; and Ester Blay for editing the text.

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1 A contrary hypothesis is that in times of deep economic recessions crime rates decrease to increase immediately afterwards (Tonry, personal communication, UPF, June 4th, 2012).

2 The crime statistics that we present here cover only 80% of the country. They exclude Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Navarre, for which we have no complete series for all crimes and years before 2010. We also exclude data for 2011, which for the first time includes statistics for the entire country, but which are not comparable to previous years.

3 Using Holt Exponential Smoothing techniques for time series it is possible to forecast the crime rates for the years 2009 and 2010 that should have ensued if crime rates had been part of this longer secular trend, and compare them with the observed rates.
the one predicted, towards declining or less steeply increasing felony rates during the economic crisis compared to the period that preceded it. This holds both for the overall categories of violent and property felonies, for the most important sub-categories of violent felonies (e.g., homicides, violence against women), and for some but not all sub-categories of property crimes. The decline affects thefts, robberies, and motor vehicle thefts. In contrast, burglaries, money laundering, and bag snatching appear to have increased, or declined less markedly, than expected by the trends observed before the recession. Only for these last categories of property felonies the expectation that crimes should increase during an economic recession holds. While the increase in money laundering felonies can be explained by authorities’ redoubled efforts to find more money to meet their higher fiscal needs, it is not apparent to us why burglaries and bag snatching increased and other property offences did not.4 Our main conclusion is, in any case, that for most violent and property felonies the crime rates during the recession did not follow the upward trend predicted by some criminological hypotheses.

The reason for this lower-than-expected incidence is not that judges started categorising the same offences as misdemeanours rather than as felonies. As the odds in the fifth and last row in Table 1 show, the trend is in the opposite direction — after 2008 violent crimes continued a trend towards being increasingly categorised as felonies rather than as misdemeanours (if less markedly than before the recession). In contrast, the recession of 2008 produced a drastic reduction in the odds

### Table 1. Felony rates in Spain previous to, and during, the economic crisis

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<td>per 1,000 inhabitants</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>2.66</td>
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<td>all, excluding robberies</td>
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<td><strong>Homicide</strong></td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>2.61</td>
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<td>2.24</td>
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<td><strong>Domestic violence</strong></td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>1.52</td>
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<td>1.64</td>
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<td>per 1,000 inhabitants</td>
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<td><strong>Women killed by their partner</strong></td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.37</td>
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<td>(per 100,000 adults)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Odds of felonies to misdemeanours</strong></td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>8.67%</td>
<td>1.32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>among violent offences</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Property felonies</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per 1,000 inhabitants</td>
<td>17.60</td>
<td>16.80</td>
<td>16.80</td>
<td>16.90</td>
<td>15.70</td>
<td>15.30</td>
<td>-4.55%</td>
<td>-9.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>including robberies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Theft</strong></td>
<td>11.10</td>
<td>10.50</td>
<td>10.70</td>
<td>11.00</td>
<td>10.20</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>-3.60%</td>
<td>-9.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per 1,000 inhabitants</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Robbery</strong></td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>-12.56%</td>
<td>-16.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per 1,000 inhabitants</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bag snatching</strong></td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>-13.04%</td>
<td>-5.41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(per 1,000 inhabitants)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Burglary</strong></td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>3.38</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>3.95</td>
<td>-5.68%</td>
<td>6.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per 1,000 households</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Motor vehicle theft</strong></td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>-24.59%</td>
<td>-37.99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(per 1,000 vehicles)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Money laundering</strong></td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>12.67%</td>
<td>65.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per 1,000,000 inhabitants</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Odds of felonies to misdemeanours</strong></td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>-0.79%</td>
<td>4.69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>among property offences</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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4 However, one should remember that many insurance companies only cover burglaries but not thefts.

Source: Own elaboration from data in the “Anuario Estadístico del Ministerio del Interior 2010”

1 Misdemeanours excluded
2 Excludes data from police jurisdictions under the control of Catalan, Basque, and Navarrese regional authorities, which are unavailable for various types of crimes in several years
3 Includes other categories of violent crimes and against individuals’ security and freedoms not shown in the table
4 Includes other categories of property crimes (e.g., extortions, identity theft) not shown in the table
that property crimes would be categorised as felonies, although since then the trend has been reversed and the odds have reached similar levels to those observed before the recession.

Another, more plausible reason for the absence of a crime escalation during the economic downturn could be that non-national young males left the country in large numbers after 2008. Non-national males are heavily over-represented among offenders (Wagman 2002). We could not find reliable data series on the nationality of offenders, but we know that the upward trend in the percentage of foreign inmates in Spanish prisons got to an abrupt halt in 2008 stabilising at around 36%. This is consistent with an analysis of migratory flows before and after that year. If from 2002 to 2007 the net migratory flow for males was positive and reflected an excess of about 350,000 arrivals over departures on average per year, by 2009 the flow had become slightly negative and remained constant. In short, data are consistent with an interpretation that links the decline in imprisonment rates during the economic slump to a halt in the inflows of foreigners into the country. However, this interpretation cannot account for the decline in imprisonment rates before the recession, when outflows clearly outpaced inflows.

A final interpretation for the absence of a rise in crime rates is that Spanish welfare state is comprehensive enough to absorb the inequality increase produced by the recession — the Gini index escalated from 31% in the three years preceding the recession to 34% in 2010 — and the rise in unemployment — from 8% in 2007 to 23% in 2011. Indeed, an analysis of the trends in how much do rich families (top 20% income bracket) spend monthly relative to poor families (bottom 20%) shows that the ratio only increased slightly after 2008, certainly below the increase in income inequalities. This is because families (both rich and poor) dedicated only 4% of their income to expenditures in health and education, as these services were universally provided by the state. In short, according to this interpretation the welfare state acted as a cushion between the increase in inequalities and crime. It is likely that as cuts in public services become more severe, this cushion may become thinner and less effective against crime.

Finally it should be noted that, as in the case of money laundering, other types of white collar crime for which we have no data might indeed have increased since the crisis started, due to raised awareness and prosecution, especially regarding political corruption and tax evasion.

**DID THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN PRISON INCREASE AFTER 2008?**

An increase in common types of property crime could produce an increase in prison entries and rates. However one possible alternative outcome of the economic crisis could be that imprisonment, due to budgetary cutbacks, decreases.

Chart 1 displays the rates of imprisonment in Spain since 2000. They increased until 2008 and began to drop in 2010. As in the case of crime trends, we applied Holt Exponential Smoothing techniques to forecast the imprisonment rates of 2009 and 2010, based on the observed trends of in previous years. The results show that the actual rates were much lower than forecasted, and significantly so, for the actual rates fall outside the 95% prediction interval.

One possible explanation for the unexpected fall in the rates of incarceration during the economic downturn is that it just mimics the drop in crime rates. However, this would not explain why before the recession decreasing crime rates were accompanied by increasing rates of incarceration.

A second possibility is that the decline in the number of inmates after 2008 was a consequence of the less serious nature of offences, for which they were imprisoned. However, as we showed before, judges were not more likely to categorise offences as misdemeanours than as felonies after 2008.

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5 Wagman (2002) estimated that 28% percent of offences could be attributed to foreigners, mostly males, while immigrants did not exceed 12% of the population (5%, in the case of males).

6 A possible explanation is that CIE (Centros de Internamiento de Extranjeros, Detention Centers for Foreigners) are being used as ‘cheap’ prisons for irregular non-citizens who have committed a crime. This is where they are being held as preventive prison and where they are serving prison sentence (while they are waiting to be deported). We owe this idea to Gonzalo Escobar (University of Girona).


9 A new prison in Figueres (Catalonia) will not open for budgetary reasons (even if closed, it costs 1.5 million Euros a month), see El País, April 19 2012.

10 These data are for the whole country, i.e., they also include Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Navarre.

11 There was a legal reform at the end of 2010 that reduced imprisonment terms for drug offences, so we expect the reduction to continue in 2011.
A third plausible explanation for the drop in the incarceration rate is that there were implicit pressures towards imposing fewer prison sentences and/or increasing ‘back door strategies.’\textsuperscript{13} If that were the case, we should detect an increase in community sentences after 2008. We have been able to generate a complete series only for three types of alternative sentences — fines, community work, and deportation orders for non-nationals — from which we have calculated trends for the period before and after 2008. The analysis shows large increases in the rates per 100,000 inhabitants for all three types of sentences (from 92 to 315, for fines; from 10 to 197, for community work; and from 1.8 to 4.3, for deportations) from 2006 to 2008, most likely as an effect of legal changes that at least in 2007 could have little to do with the upcoming economic crisis. Since 2008, the rates of community sentences have remained stable or decreased slightly for all three types of alternative sentences.\textsuperscript{14}

Finally, we do not have the data to examine if living conditions in prison have worsened. However the number of programs in prison has decreased since the start of the economic crisis, after a sharp increase the previous years.\textsuperscript{15}

PUBLIC OPINION
Public opinion might be expected to be less worried about crime, since the economy is already such a pressing concern. Although discussions to introduce life sentence keep being brought up by politicians\textsuperscript{16} public opinion data suggests it is in accordance with expectations. Our analysis of the survey data made available by the Spanish Center for Sociological Research as part of their monthly national barometers of public opinion, shows that average yearly perceptions of crime insecurity as one of the top problems in the country have dropped consistently since 2008, following a trend that started in 2006. Whilst in 2006 about 20% of the Spanish adult population felt that crime insecurity was one of the three most important problems in the country, in 2011 the percentage had dropped to just over 7%. Partly this was to be expected, partly it poses an interesting challenge to the ‘scapegoat theory’.

CONCLUSIONS
Our data reflect trends only until 2010. According to these data, most violent and property crime rates did not increase during the recession. Why these types of crimes did not increase might have to do with socio-demographic changes, with the persistence of the welfare state in Spain, or with other related factors that require additional research. Whether this decrease will continue in the future is hard to predict.

The rates of imprisonment in Spain increased from 2000 until 2008 and began to drop in 2010. Reasons for this drop need to be further investigated, but it is reasonable to expect further drops in 2011 due to recent legal reforms. From 2006 until 2008 the rates of community sentences for fines and community work increased drastically, most likely as an effect of legal changes; since 2008 until 2010 they have remained stable or decreased slightly, and will probably decrease even more in 2011 as a result of legal reforms.

Average yearly perceptions of crime insecurity as one of the top problems in the country have dropped consistently since 2008. In 2006 about 20% of the Spanish adult population felt that crime insecurity was one of the three most important problems in the country, in 2011 the percentage had dropped to just over 7%. Partly this was to be expected, partly it poses an interesting challenge to the ‘scapegoat theory’.

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Elena Larrauri is a profesor of criminology and criminal law at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona.

\textsuperscript{13} This seems to be the case for Catalonia where the Justice Department tries very hard to decrease prison population through the following means: a) granting the open regime even if the person does not have a job outside; b) increasing individuals in parole (adding some more supervision); c) promoting the return to their country of origin of non national citizens once they have served 50% of their sentence; d) pleading for the possibility of increasing suspended sentence up to 5 years (instead of 2). See Departament de Justícia, Generalitat de Catalunya (2011) ‘Circular 1/2011 del 11 de Juliol de 2011 sobre estrangeria als centres penitenciaris de Catalunya.’ Available at: http://www20.gencat.cat/portal/site/Justicia/[Accessed 13 of April 2012].

\textsuperscript{14} In 2011, the decrease will be even larger due to a legal reform of the criminal code in 2010. The impact of the crisis might be reflected in the privatisation of probation services, which have been outsourced and are being carried out by private agencies.


\textsuperscript{16} See ‘Tiene acomodo constitucional’ El Pais, November 12, 2011.
CRIMINOLOGY IN SPAIN

HISTORY AND EVOLUTION
Criminology in Spain has undergone periods of significant growth as well as periods of relative stagnation. Compared to other countries, the field was developed and institutionalised at an early stage. In the first half of the 19th century, Mariano Cubí i Soler (1801–1875) proposed a set of ideas anticipating those later developed by Lombroso. Studies by authors like Rafael Salillas (1854–1923), Pedro Dorado Montero (1861–1919), Concepción Arenal (1820–1894) and Constancio Bernardo de Quirós (1873–1959) founded a tradition of budding research in Spanish criminology known as correctionalism. Correctionalism was based on the idea of ‘Correctional Education.’ According to this idea, punishment shall lack any sort of repression; it shall, instead, serve as protector of the criminal’s best interest. One of the main achievements of correctionalism was the first criminology school founded by Salillas in 1903 at the Madrid prison. At that time there was no clear distinction between Criminal Law, Criminal policy and Criminology.

During the 19th century and the first two decades of the 20th century, institutions like the Ateneo and Institución Libre de Enseñanza pioneered the form of educational centres into operation. In 1934, Quintiliano Saldaña (1878–1938) founded the International Association of Penal Law, now based in Paris. For Saldaña, the correctionalist school was penology, while the positivist was criminology. The former saw its main task in trying to correct the delinquent, and the latter in preventing the offence by acquiring scientific knowledge about offenders and crime.

With the Spanish civil war (1936–39), practically all the prestigious criminologists had to go into exile, from where they continued their work. During the first years of the Francoist dictatorship, criminology in Spain was practically limited to the isolated efforts of a few researchers. However, the 1950s brought with it a resurgence, influenced by the new ideas in Europe. Academic criminology started in the big cities as an answer to growing public concern with urban security problems. In 1955, Octavio Pérez Victoria founded — inspired by the model of criminal justice studies in the USA — the Institute of Criminology in Barcelona. And in 1964, the Institute of Criminology at the Complutense University, Madrid was founded, with Juan del Rosal as the first director. Both institutes could only offer non-accredited courses, and were not part of the higher education system. This model became national approach, which gave rise to several, but not all, institutes emerging within the departments of criminal law. This legal influence defined the approach to criminology in Spain. However, the 1970s ushered a slower growth, although other cities like Valencia, San Sebastián and Santiago de Compostela established new institutes.

In addition, Antonio Beristain founded the Basque Institute of Criminology in 1976. His research on the victims of ETA terrorism was especially important. The significance of his educational and academic contributions — in favour of the non-violent pursuit of human rights — led to the creation of a big and prestigious criminological school, an important centre of victimological research, becoming an important bridge between Europe and Ibero-America. This institute, now headed by José Luis de la Cuesta, serves as the main organiser of the ESC Annual Meeting this year.

During the Second Republic, which lasted from 1931 until the its defeat to the Francoist forces in the Spanish civil war in 1939, the young Manuel López-Rey served as director of Prison Administration in Madrid. Later, having been sentenced to death, he fled Spain, relocating to Bolivia, Chile, Argentina and Peru, and did not return until the arrival of the democratic regime. He mostly dedicated himself to teaching, at the University Complutense, Madrid and at the University of Cambridge, whilst also serving as chairman of the Committee on Crime Prevention at the United Nations.

The 1990 witnessed an unprecedented expansion of the field of criminology. This growth came from the parallel expansion of the university system, with the creation of new universities in smaller cities, and a significant social interest affirmed by the consider-
able number of registered students. These students are mostly connected to the Andalusian Institute of Criminology, founded in five cities: Sevilla, Málaga, Córdoba, Cádiz and Granada.

**CRIMINOLOGY IN THE SPANISH HIGHER EDUCATION**

The expansion of criminological studies nowadays in Spain is noticeable. An increasing number of Spanish universities are offering official courses in criminology. For example, since 2003, graduate studies in criminology have become available at several universities, i.e., Barcelona, Gerona, Alicante, and Murcia. And 2009 marked a significant event with introduction of an undergraduate degree in criminology, adding Spain to the handful of European countries with criminology studies at every level of higher education. The duration of the BA is four years, while that of the MA varies between one and two years. The curriculum is shaped by the Spanish criminological tradition. It includes classes on criminology, crime prevention, victimology, criminal policy, forensic medicine, research methods in social sciences, quantitative and qualitative research methods in criminology, criminal Law, procedural criminal law, forensic psychology, the sociology of crime, etc.

Some universities still offer non-accredited diplomas via university institutes or other institutes attached to a particular faculty. Such curricula rather resemble continuing education for professionals, indicating that in Spain, besides accredited university courses, there is a continuing effort to provide advanced training and vocational education at a quasi-university level for practitioners.

Despite the scant job opportunities offered to criminology graduates — which tend to be limited to the areas of security forces, victim assistance offices, penitentiary institutions and the juvenile justice system — these degrees are enjoying surprising popularity.

In recent years Spanish universities have began offering professional diplomas under the label of security studies. These arose as a response to new social demand based on the necessity to offer specific training on security and private investigative issues. Most of these incorporate elements of criminology, together with other security issues like management, planning, risk analysis or intelligence technologies. Thus, Spanish Criminology is slowly opening to new paradigms and professional markets, as a response to the increasing demands and preoccupations in security matters.

However, there remain categorical obstacles, like persistent structural problems and the limited autonomy of the field. Despite the popularity of criminology among students, despite the several BA and MA courses offered, the institutional background is still shaped by traditional disciplinary boundaries. There are hardly any professors of criminology; courses are taught by academics from other disciplines (sociology, psychology) where criminological issues play a marginal role.

**CRIMINOLOGICAL RESEARCH IN SPAIN**

In Spanish criminology, the emphasis has always been on education, which was rarely supported by empirical research. This began to change 20 years ago. A unique feature is the small number of researchers, who, despite the numerous difficulties to obtain official statistics as well as funding, regularly conduct significant research and are active in academic societies.

Spain has several academic journals specialising in criminology and related fields, including: *Boletín Criminológico* (University of Malaga), the *Revista española de Investigación en Criminología* (REIC), the *Revista electrónica de Ciencia penal y Criminología* (University of Granada), the *Revista de Derecho Penal y Criminología* (UNED), the *Cuadernos de Política Criminal* (Complutense University) and *Eguzkilore* (University of the Basque Country). None of these have a considerable international prestige, but they have nevertheless contributed to the dissemination of criminological knowledge at national and international (South America) levels.

The creation of the Spanish Society of Criminological Research (SEIC) in 2000 was especially significant. With the founding purpose of promoting criminological research, its objective is to bring together a group of researchers and experts in criminology, regardless of their origin and position in the field. It intends to serve as a communicative bridge among scientists, thus promoting the transfer of research findings into points of convergence, dissemination and discussion at both national and international levels. Since 2004, the Spanish Society of Criminological Research (SEIC/www.criminologia.net) and the Federation of Criminology (FACE/www.criminologos.net) organise an annual national Congress of Criminology.
Presently, the main research centres in criminology are located in Andalusia, Castilla-La Mancha, Catalonia and the Basque Country. The Malaga section of the Andalusian Interuniversity Institute of Criminology is a centre scientific research and academic specialisation. Directed by José Luis Díez Ripollés, professor of Criminal Law, its research projects concentrate on delinquency analysis and criminal policy. The influence of Per Stangeland has also been instrumental in research development — focusing on gender violence, victimology, immigration delinquency, mapping crime, cybercrime.

In 1999, the Research Centre of Criminology of the University of Castilla-la Mancha was created, thus institutionalising the support to the teaching and research activities undertaken since 1990. Directed by Cristina Rechea, professor of Psychology, it stands out for its research on juvenile delinquency.

There are also two important research teams in Catalonia. The first is the Research Group in Applied Criminological Studies on Penology, created in 1995 and recognised by the Catalunya Government in 2005. Being an interuniversity centre, it comprises of professors and researchers from the Autonomous University of Barcelona (UAB), the Pompeu Fabra University (UPF) and the University of Girona (UdG). Its directors are Josep Cid (UAB), Elena Larrauri (UPF) and Gonzalo Escobar and Daniel Varona (UdG). The research group focuses on penology, attempting to demonstrate that alternative sanction systems to prison, alternative means of conflict resolution and transition mechanisms between prison and social reintegration can be more human and more effective than use of punitive systems. Within this general framework, its topics of interest are: alternative sanctions, systems of early release, and the relation between the criminal system and gender, immigration and public opinion.

The Personality Research Group: Behaviour Prediction and Assessment (GEAV) of the University of Barcelona studies and analyses violent behaviour in its different forms and social manifestations from a comprehensive psychological perspective. It is especially concerned with violence prevention and prediction. Its specialty is the construction and application of protocols for risk assessment of different forms of violence.

The Basque Institute of Criminology

The Organising Institution of the 2012 Annual Meeting

The Basque Institute of Criminology (IVAC-KREI), created in 1976 by Antonio Beristain Ipina as an interdisciplinary research institute, was officially established in 1978. It is integrated into the University of the Basque Country (Universidad del Pais Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea), the only public (not private) university in the Basque Country. Since 2000, the Institute conducts its activities under the direction of Jose Luis de la Cuesta, who, since 2004, also serves as the President of the International Association of Penal Law (AIDP-IAPL). Research and education (both university-level and continuing education for practitioners) in criminological sciences, penal law and victimology are the main tasks of the Institute, which also publishes an annual review (Eguzkilore. Cuaderno del Instituto Vasco de Criminología). In its research projects, great emphasis is given to international and European cooperation. As a result,
Antonio Andrés Pueyo and Santiago Redondo are the heads of this research group.

The International Centre for Research on Delinquency, Marginalisation and Social Relationships (DMS International Research Centre) was established in 1993 as part of the Basque Institute of Criminology through an agreement between the International Society of Criminology and the University of the Basque Country in San Sebastian. It is directed by César San Juan (for more information on the Basque Institute of Criminology, see the profile of the organizers of the Annual Meeting down below).

CONCLUSION

Spanish criminology has experienced dramatic developments in the last half-century. Research groups and Institutes are abound, and most universities offer curricula in criminology. It is now an established discipline in Spanish academic life, one that is extremely popular with students. A reason for this popularity might be the level of media attention accorded issues of crime and safety—even though crime rates in Spain are among the lowest in Europe. But despite these achievements, two major problems remain. One is the non-functional use of diplomas in criminology in the labour market. We have many devoted student, and we do our best to prepare them for a wide range of hypothetical jobs, but how successful criminologist will prove to be on the labour market still remains to be seen.

The second is the weak autonomy of our discipline. Issues of crime and crime control are considered marginal in the related disciplines, yet criminologists remain simultaneously engaged with other disciplines, i.e., law, sociology, psychology. The lack of autonomy is partly an institutional problem but also an epistemological one.

Despite these problems, I still believe that the future is bright, as criminology in Spain is youthful and energetic, thanks in large part to the upcoming generation and their promising research.

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4 The Basque Institute of Criminology, officially established in 1978 as a university institute of research, is presently directed by Prof. José Luis de la Cuesta, offers education programmes for students and researchers from European countries.
Victim support activities in Hungary started mainly in the 1990s, however victimology — as a special field of criminology — has been a research field in the country with a longer history.1

One of the early works in the field of victimology was published in 1968 by a Hungarian professor, István (Stephen) Schäfer, living in the United States.2 From the mid 1940s criminology and victimology were considered to be useless science, because criminality was seen as a product of imperialism, and as such it would self-evidently disappear in a socialist society. This, of course, did not happen; so criminality became the subject of studies by sociologist started to observe and research criminality in the early 1970s. The field neither has disappeared from the criminal law studies, and efforts were made to inform the Hungarian science field about international developments in victimology.3 In the 1980s the first latency researches started in the country (Korinek, 1982, 1988, Sajó 1989) to draw a better picture of the reality of victimhood and criminality in Hungary. These researches mainly focused on the sense of safety of the population, the rates of reporting crimes to the authorities and the trust in the criminal justice system. The end of the 1980s has brought important changes and development for the country with the start of the transition to a democratic state and society. The importance of the field of victimology emerged which can be illustrated by the establishment of the Victimology Section of the Hungarian Society of Criminology in 1989.4 From 1992 Hungary was taking part in the International Crime Victim Survey by UNICRI.5 The most important monographs on victimology are written by Ilona Görgényi (University of Miskolc), and research within the Institute of Criminology (e.g. Barabás, T., Kiss, A., Kerezsi, K., Kö, J.) also touches upon the most relevant questions of this field.

Turning now from the scientific background to the practice, 1989 brought important steps here as well. The first organisations established for helping crime victims were NGOs, like the Hungarian White Ring,6 which was founded in 1989. There are still only few civil organisations working in this field, some of them specialised in victims of different types of crime, like NANE7 and Patent8 offering services for victims of domestic violence, or the ESZTER Foundation9 working with victims of sexual violence. Besides all those non-governmental efforts, we can state that the most important actors in the field of victim support in Hungary are state services. The Police have more and more victim related tasks, and having been taking part in victim protection since 1999, currently there are victim protection police officers working within the Police’s crime prevention units in the whole country (however in fact victim protection is not their primary duty). The most important organisation on this field is undeniably the Victim Support Service,10 a government agency, which was established in 2006 by Act Nr. 135 of 2005 on Crime Victim Support and State Compensation (hereinafter Victim Support Act) under the auspices of the Ministry of Justice. Since the ministerial structure was changed in 2010, the professional supervision of the Victim Support Service is now a duty of the Ministry of Interior, yet the institutional background is provided by the Ministry of Public Administration and Justice. The act itself was based on two EU regulations: Council Framework Decision on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings11 and Council Directive relating to compensation to crime victims.12

This article will explain the different services victims are entitled to have, and also the organisational character and the legal background of the Victim Support Service’s work.

1 Eg. Arnold and Korinek 1989; Korinek, 1988; Sajó, 1989
2 Schäfer, I.: The Victim and his Criminal. New York, 1968
4 http://kriminologia.hu/sites/default/files/beszamolo_vsz.pdf
5 http://www.uncjin.org/Standards/policy.pdf
6 http://www.fehergyuru.eu/
7 http://www.nane.hu/
8 http://patent.org.hu/
9 http://www.eszteralapitvany.hu/
10 http://www.kimisz.gov.hu/alaptev/aldozatsegito
THE DEFINITION OF VICTIM
According to the Victim Support Act victim can be the injured party of any crime committed in the territory of Hungary if he/she is a natural person, also any natural person who has suffered injury as a direct consequence of a criminal act, in particular bodily or emotional harm, mental shock or economic loss. This definition of victim is based on the one in the EU Council Framework Decision on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings. However, this definition in the Victim Support Act is different from the definition of ‘victim’ (injured party) in the Hungarian Criminal Procedure Act, as it, on the one hand, refers to a wider group of injured or harmed natural persons than the Criminal Procedure Act (for example, victim support services can be obtained by people, who have not been physically injured but were witnessing the violence). On the other hand, however, according to the Criminal Procedure Act legal persons can also be considered as victims of crime, whilst Victim Support Act limits its scope to natural persons.

SERVICES TO VICTIMS
The essence of victim support is that on the basis of social solidarity and equity, the State is providing services for those it had not been able to protect from crime. According to the Victim Support Act victim support aims at mitigating the social moral injuries and pecuniary harm of victims whose quality of life has been endangered due to a criminal act.

Besides providing basic and general information to everyone turning to the Victim Support Service (regardless of their victim status), the Hungarian system consists of two main forms of help for victims of crimes. One is the system of victim support services and the other is the form of state compensation. Victim support services contain: facilitating the protection of the victim’s interests, granting instant monetary aid and providing legal aid (throughout the Legal Aid Service). The main difference is that while victim support services are available for victims of all types of crimes, only victims of violent intentional crimes may be eligible for state compensation.

I. Information and advice
Everyone who turns to the Victim Support Service is entitled to information and advice free of charge. This means that not only victims, but anybody can get advice from the Service on the following:

- the rights and obligations of victims in criminal proceedings,
- the forms of victim support available to him/her and the conditions for application therefore,
- any other available benefits, allowances and opportunities to assert his/her rights,
- the contact details of state, local government, civil and church organisations involved in helping victims of crime, and
- the opportunities to avoid secondary victimisation with a view to the type of the criminal act.

II. Victim Support Services

Facilitate the protection of victims’ interests
The Victim Support Service helps victims, in a manner and to the extent they may require, through the enforcement of their fundamental rights and for having access to healthcare, health insurance and social welfare services. Moreover, the Service provides legal advice and assistance to help the victim to get remedy for the injury. There is no deadline for submitting an application for this kind of service. This type of help is very similar to the work of social workers.

Instant monetary aid
This monetary aid may cover the victim’s extraordinary expenses in connection with housing, clothing, nutrition and travel, medical and funeral expenses if he/she is unable, as a consequence of being victimised in a crime, to cover such expenses.

The application for this aid shall be submitted within 5 days after the crime was committed. The crime has to be reported to the police. The victim can be entitled to this aid irrespective of his/her general financial standing. Maximum amount of the aid changes every year (according to the nationwide gross monthly average income in Hungary). In 2012 the maximum amount is approximately 290 Euro.

Legal aid
If the injury to a needy victim can only be remedied by means of legal aid and help defined in the Legal Aid Act, the Victim Support Service refers the case to the competent Legal Aid Service. Only victims in financial need can get free legal aid. This means that

14 According to Eurostat statistics, the monthly minimal wage in Hungary in 2012 is € 295.63, therefore the maximum amount of instant monetary aid is to be considered reasonable. For further details on minimal wage see: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=earn_mw_cur&lang=en
their regular monthly income may not exceed a certain amount of money (approximately 580 euro/month/capita in 2012\textsuperscript{15}). There is no deadline for submitting an application for this aid.

III. State compensation
According to the Victim Support Act state compensation is the other form of victim support. Only those indigent victims are entitled to state compensation who suffered a violent and intentional act, unlawful in terms of criminal law, and as a direct consequence, their physical integrity or health has been seriously damaged. In some special cases, compensation can be provided to family members of the victim too.

State compensation has a special procedural system. The procedure — in harmonisation with the EU Council Directive\textsuperscript{16} — consists of two phases: the assistance and the decision-making phase. The form of state compensation can be lump-sum cash payment, or regular monthly instalment.

THE VICTIM SUPPORT SERVICE — ORGANISATION
The Victim Support Service started its activity in 2006 as part of the Office of Justice (also covering other services such as Probation, Victim-Offender Mediation, Legal Aid, Restitution and Lobby Authority), which via its 20 local justice services had a nationwide competence.

In 2011 the institutional framework was amended and the new Justice Service of Ministry of Public Administration and Justice succeeded the Office of Justice. This new body is responsible for providing methodological and professional leadership as well as supervision in the field of probation, legal aid and victim support services of Hungary, while the practice of these fields is provided by another structure, the Government Offices of each county of Hungary.

The Victim Support Service (on central and local level) has been operating with approximately 48 paid workers, almost exclusively all of whom are lawyers. As it can be seen, victim support is more law and administration oriented in Hungary, operating mostly with legal professionals. Therefore the system lacks the sufficient availability of psychological or any kind of mental assistance, even though these lawyers are able to provide some basic emotional support (due to sensitising trainings). However, this deficiency of the system had been recognised, and steps were made towards complementing it, within the project called TAMOP 5.6.2 (Social Renewal Operational Programme)\textsuperscript{17} which is co-financed by the European Union and the Hungarian Government. Regarding the development of victim support, the project aims three main goals: to ensure instant help for victims provided by psychologists, to establish a free 24/7 helpline for victims of crime and to build up a network of volunteers for victims with volunteers available in rural areas outside the county seats.

RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
Writing about victim’s services in Hungary, we also have to mention the possibility for the victim of choosing victim-offender mediation during the criminal procedure. This service has been implemented in Hungary in 2007, but it cannot be used in all criminal procedures. However in the most important ones (like any crime against property, violence, harassment) the victim has the right to ask for this service, which is free of charge. In case of the victim’s and the offender’s willingness to participate, and the prosecutor’s or the judge’s permission of suspending the criminal procedure and sending the case to mediation, the victim has the opportunity to meet the offender face-to-face, explain the effects of the crime on his/her life, get his/her questions answered by the offender and ask for any kind of restitution. There are approximately 5,000 mediation cases per year, of which around 70% are fully successful (mediation with fulfilled agreement). Although any form of restitution is acceptable, victims usually ask for material compensation, which shows that other resources for that sake (like insurance companies, state compensation or legal procedures to get compensation from the offender) are not fully satisfactory.

FINANCIAL BACKGROUND OF INSTANT MONETARY AID AND STATE COMPENSATION
Instant monetary aid and state compensation are paid from a separate budgetary fund. In the Budget Act a not maximised Appropriation Chapter is regulated under the name “Victim Support”. The Appropriation Chapter contains a certain amount of money every year which can be filled up mid-year by the Ministry of Interior if it runs out.

\textsuperscript{15} Considering that those earning even the double of the minimal wage (per capita) are still not overstepping the level of indigency, this regulation is fair and square.


\textsuperscript{17} http://tettprogram.hu/news
In some countries there are special funds which are designed for paying the compensation agreed between the victim and offender during the mediation directly and immediately to the victim, and the offender has the duty to pay it back to the fund in instalments in a longer period. In Hungary, this kind of compensation fund does not exist.

STATISTICS
The table shows the number of clients in each year, sorted by the service they have asked for at the Victim Support Service:

It is clearly visible that the number of clients or contacts at the Victim Support Service was growing year by year, although since 2010 there has been stagnation in this respect. The reason behind this is not the rising levels of crime and victimhood in the country (which indeed tended to be fairly stable during these years), but the effect of the growing reputation of the Service. In this regard, the role of the Police has to be highlighted because the Police has an obligation to inform every victim about the Victim Support Service whenever they meet first (usually when they report the crime). Moreover, most of the victims turn to the Service during the police investigation, and as a result, effective cooperation between the Victim Support Service and the Police is essential.

However, the Service still cannot reach most of the crime victims. According to the Criminal Statistics of 2011 there were approximately 262,000 natural person victims in Hungary registered by the police authorities. Around 7.3% of these people were helped and supported by the Victim Support Service in 2011. (In 2006 when the Service started its activity, this rate was 4%, in 2007 it was 5%, in 2008 it was 5.7%, whilst in 2009 it rose to 9.24% and in 2010 it was around 7.8%.)

To sum up, we presume that in general, the Hungarian Victim Support System has many strong points, particularly providing legal and monetary support for crime victims should be emphasised. It is important that the State secures organisational and monetary resources for helping victims of crime in a regulated way and all over the country. However, it is beyond controversy that there are fields within victim support in Hungary which need further efforts and developments. Providing instant psychological and emotional support, better accessibility of the existing services in space (not only at the county seats, but also in smaller towns and villages) and in time (beyond the official working hours) and finally, upon the request of the victim, better availability of restorative justice services might be the prospects and strategies for the future.

CONCLUSION
Protecting and supporting victims of crime and a more unified regulation on victim support in the EU was also one of the highlighted topics during Hungarian Presidency of the Council of the European Union in 2011. However, the Hungarian criminal procedure is still a lot criticised because its negligence or even secondary victimisation of crime victims. The general rate of return of monetary loss connected to a criminal act is still not more than 7–8% and the access for restorative justice services (mainly victim-offender mediation) is still restricted, or, in other words, it is not possible to ask for it at every stage of the procedure or for all the victims regardless of the type of the offence or the characteristics of the offender.

19 The Hungarian situation in the 1980s was described well by Tibor Király when he wrote: ‘There are only a few systems of law where the victim would be in such a subordinate procedural position as in ours.’ Tibor Király: A büntető eljárási jog útjai. (Ways of the Criminal Procedural Law.) Magyar Jog, 1985/3-4, p. 258 – quoted by Roth, E. (2011). We can add that procedural rights of victims haven’t changed a lot in the last decades in Hungary.
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**NEWS FROM THE EDITORS OF THE EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY**

**Paul Knepper**

**CHANGES TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD AT THE EJC**

The editorial structure of the European Journal of Criminology has changed. The journal now has an editor, Paul Knepper, and three associate editors: Leonidas Cheliotis, Jan de Keijser and Julian Roberts. There is an expanded editorial board.

When the journal was established in 2004, there was a small editorial board and a large international advisory board. The editorial board discussed publication policy and the advisory board supplied the base of reviewers. As the journal increased in popularity, the membership of both the editorial board and the advisory board expanded. There was probably a time when the advisory board could carry out most of the reviews, but that changed. Over the years, the reviewer base needed to continued to grow, and there was an increasingly need for reviewing the size and purpose of the advisory board.

The advisory board has been abolished. Earlier this year, the editorial office contacted each member of the advisory board to find out about interest in the journal. (Or tried to — we are still searching for valid emails in some cases, finding out about retirements and other changes.) The editorial board will take the place of the advisory board in carrying out reviews. We have asked that members serve for a 3 year term and participate in an editorial board meeting scheduled to take place during the ESC conference. We look forward to our first meeting in Bilbao.

Paul Knepper is a professor of criminology at the University of Sheffield, Centre for Criminological Research, and the editor of the European Journal of Criminology.
In 2011, the European Society of Criminology (ESC) had 732 members coming from 49 different countries (52 if figures for the United Kingdom are breakdown by nations). The United Kingdom was well represented, with 150 members, followed by Belgium (67 members), Germany (63), United States of America (55), Switzerland (45), Italy (43), The Netherlands (42), Spain (33), Austria (14), Finland (14), Ireland (14), Canada (13), Greece (13), Australia (12), Sweden (12), France (11), Poland (11), Portugal (11), Hungary (10), Norway (10), Denmark (9), Slovenia (8), Japan (7), Serbia (7), Czech Republic (6), Estonia (5), Lithuania (5), Croatia (4), Bosnia and Herzegovina (3), Cyprus (3), Iceland (3), Israel (3), Luxemburg (3), Russia (3), Turkey (3), Latvia (2), Malta (2), South Africa (2), and Albania, Armenia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Iran, New Zealand, Nigeria, Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine and Uruguay, with one member per country (see Figure 1). Compared to 2010, the number of countries represented at the ESC has increased — from 45 to 49 —, but the total number of members has decreased by 7%, going from 787 in 2010 to the already mentioned 732 in 2011. Students represented 22% of the members, a stable percentage since 2008 (see Figure 2).

At the same time, 590 criminologists participated in the 11th Annual Conference of the ESC, which took place in Vilnius, Lithuania, from 21st to 24th September 2011. This number of participants is slightly lower than the one registered in the 2010 Liege Conference, which was followed by 623 persons.
One of the possible reasons for the decreases in the number of ESC members and participants in the ESC conferences is the economic crisis that affects most countries in Europe, which in most cases had an impact on the University budgets. For example, the number of members from Greece went from 23 in 2010 to 13 in 2011. Another cause that can be measured quite easily is the influence of the number of members and participants from the country which is organising the annual conference and its neighbouring states. As we have mentioned in former Annual Reports, usually the number of members from these countries increase in an important way during the year of the conference and tends to decrease in the following year or years. For example, in 2010, the conference was organised in Belgium and the number of members from that country went from 59 in 2009 to 96 in 2010, before decreasing to 67 in 2011. The same is true for its neighbour, the Netherlands, which counted 49 members in 2009, 63 in 2010, and 42 in 2011. In the same perspective, in 2009 the conference was organised in Slovenia, and the members from that country increased from 7 in 2008 to 45, before decreasing to 15 in 2010. On the contrary, in 2011, the number of members from Baltic countries – which was quite low in previous years – did not increase in a way that could have an impact on the overall figures. In particular, the number of members from Lithuania went from 3 in 2010 to 5 in 2011, while from Estonia it went from 4 to 5, and from Latvia from nil to 2.

Nevertheless, at the moment we are writing these lines (end of June 2012), the situation for 2012 looks pretty good, as the ESC already has more than 700 members, and more than 700 abstracts have been accepted for the 2012 Annual Conference in Bilbao, Spain. This evolution corroborates the influence of the location of the annual conference, not only in terms of the ‘tourist’ attractiveness of it, but mainly in relation to the size of its criminological scientific community. The rule seems to be the following: the higher the number of criminologists in the country organising the annual conference, the higher the number of ESC members and conference participants during the year of the conference. Nonetheless, as two of the objectives of the ESC are ‘to foster criminological scholarship, research, education and training within academic institutions’ and ‘to encourage scholarly, scientific and practical exchange and cooperation among those engaged in criminology, particularly at the European and international levels’ (Section 1 of the ESC Constitution), it seems perfectly justified to organise conferences precisely in the countries where criminology is still developing.

During 2011, the ESC website received 32,087 visits, representing an average of 2,674 visits per month or 88 per day. As can be seen in Figure 3, these figures are similar to the ones registered in 2010. Visitors downloaded 19,515 files. The book of abstracts of the Ljubljana conference was downloaded almost 3,000 times, and the programmes of Liege and Ljubljana as well as issue 3/2010 of the ESC Newsletter were also among the most downloaded files (i.e. more than 1,000 times). The highest monthly number of visitors (3,124) was registered in March. That month, visitors came mainly from the United States (906), the United Kingdom (254), China (252), Belgium (193), Germany (192), Switzerland (95), Italy (133), Ireland (78), Russia (77), Spain (71), and the Netherlands (51). The ‘top 5’ is thus exactly the same as in 2010, and there are few changes in the distribution of the number of visitors from the rest of the countries. However, it must be mentioned that, since 2011, the ESC Newsletter (Criminology in Europe) also has its own website (http://www.escnewsletter.org), whose visits are
not included in our figures. The same is true for the visits to the conference websites, which are kept by the local organisers of the annual conferences.

Indeed, in 2011, the ESC Newsletter started a new era under the direction of its new editor, Csaba Győry, who has not only created a specific website for it, but also developed a full brand new design for its paper version. Csaba Győry is filling with a lot of energy the difficult task of replacing Michael Tonry, who had been the editor of Criminology in Europe during its first ten years. In that period, Michael Tonry managed to give the newsletter a particularly high profile, by including a lot of articles in it, which are quoted even in scientific publications, something that seldom happens with texts published in Newsletters.

2011 was also the first year for Paul Knepper as Editor-in-Chief of the European Journal of Criminology. It was also the year in which the journal received its first impact factor corresponding to the 2010 Thomson ISI rankings. For its first year in this index, the European Journal of Criminology received an impact factor of 1.159, ranking 16 out the 43 journals included in the area of Criminology and Penology. This very good result is the outcome of the excellent work of the David J. Smith and Julian V. Roberts, the first two Editors-in-Chief of the journal, which is now being continued with the same level of excellence by Paul Knepper.

In 2011, the ESC awarded three Fellowships to attend the Annual Conference of the European Society of Criminology. The beneficiaries were Stojanka Mirceva (The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), Milena Tripkovic Pavlovic (Serbia), and Ivana Vrselja (Croatia), who were thus able to attend the Vilnius conference. The panel that awarded the fellowships was composed by Krzysztof Krajewski (Jagiellonian University, Cracow, Poland), Aleksandras Dobryninas (University of Vilnius, Lithuania), and Jenny Johnstone (Newcastle University, United Kingdom, representing the European Postgraduate and Early Stage Researchers working group of the ESC).

The ESC awarded the 2011 ESC European Criminology Award to Inkeri Anttila in recognition of her lifetime contribution to European criminology. The award committee — composed by former ESC presidents Krzysztof Krajewski (chair, Jagiellonian University, Cracow, Poland), Elena Larrauri (Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona, Spain), and Kauko Aromaa (HEUNI, Helsinki, Finland) — was impressed by her significant contribution to the development of criminology and penology, as well as penal practice, in Finland, in Europe, and in the world. The award committee considered Inkeri Anttila’s contribution to the development of the ideas of fairness in the criminal justice system, the proportionality of crime and punishment especially noteworthy, just as her role on the
overall reform of the criminal justice system in Finland, and her work as the Director of the Institute of Criminology of the Ministry of Justice, the Director of the United Nations Regional Institute for Crime Prevention and Control in Europe and as well as a Professor at the University of Helsinki; and her major contributions to criminology in the fields of victimisation studies, the role and rights of crime victims, criminal punishment and other strategies of crime control, critics of coercive care, and legal safeguard and legitimacy.

The 2011 ESC Young Criminologist Award went to Sappho Xenakis in recognition of her article ‘Pride and Prejudice: Comparative corruption research and the British case’, published in 2010 in Crime, Law and Social Change. The award committee was composed by Tapio Lappi-Seppälä (chair, National Research Institute of Legal Policy, Finland) Ana Cerezo (University of Malaga, Spain), and Rossella Selmini (University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, Italy). The committee considered, in summary, that: Dr. Xenakis showed a high degree of originality and a thorough understanding of the phenomenon under investigation. She displayed solid capacity to carry out comparative research and to cross national academic cultures. By pointing out the problems related to the use and construction of perception indices and the validity and pertinence of variables within, the article has lifted up questions to be addressed in further comparative corruption research, and even beyond.

In sum, in spite of the economic crisis, the ESC shows a good situation and the future looks promising, as the upcoming 12th Annual Conference in Bilbao, Spain (12–15 September 2012) is probably going to register a very high numbers of participants.
Michael Tonry is an American. He holds a chair in law and public policy at The University of Minnesota. He is the editor of Crime and Justice. A Review of Research since its start in 1980 (originally as a co-editor). He recently became one of two directors of the newly founded Robina Institute of Criminal and Criminal Justice at The University of Minnesota Law School.

Michael Tonry could equally be regarded as a European. He had been director of The Institute of Criminology at Cambridge University, and he has been fellow, visiting professor or held other visiting posts at Oxford University, University of Birmingham, University of Lausanne, The Netherlands Institute for the Study of Crime and Law Enforcement at Leiden, and The Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law in Freiburg. In 2010 he received an honorary doctorate from Free University Amsterdam. And he lives in Florence!

Michael Tonry’s writings encompass many subjects. His main area is without doubt criminal policy in its widest sense. Among his latest monographs in this field are Thinking about Punishment (2009), Retribution Has a Past. Has it a Future? and Punishing Race: A Continuing American Dilemma (2011).

Michael Tonry could also be seen as a European in his capacity as an editor. He has been the editor of the Studies in Crime and Public Policy, the Oxford Handbooks on Criminology and Criminal Justice, together with Anthony Duff, the Studies in Penal Theory and Philosophy (all published by the Oxford University Press). He also recently started an European branch for Crime and Justice with two volumes already brought out.

And he had also been involved with the European Society of Criminology from its very beginning: he launched Criminology in Europe, the newsletter of the society, and had edited it for eight years, until 2010.

With Michael Tonry as its president, the ESC would be represented by someone with exceptional qualities: an impressive body of seminal, widely cited work on central issues of crime and criminal policy; a good knowledge of European criminological milieus; and, last but not least, a wide network academic collaborators in many countries on two continents, and a clear commitment to a further development of European criminology and the ESC.

(Henrik Tham)
Klaus Boers is Professor of Criminology and Director of the Institute of Penal Sciences, Department of Criminology, at the Faculty of Law of the University of Muenster. He studied law and was junior researcher in criminology at the University of Hamburg (dissertation on crime attitudes). He was senior researcher at the Institute of Criminology of the University of Tuebingen (he did his professorial habilitation on life-course-criminology). After a locum professorship in Criminology at the University of Dresden he was appointed to the professorship in Muenster. He was a visiting scholar at Northwestern University in Evanston IL, at the University of Colorado at Boulder; at Ritsumeikan University in Kyoto, at the University of Niigata, at Chuo University in Tokyo and the University of Cambridge. His main areas of research are currently criminological life-course research; economic crime; crime theory and criminological model construction; self-reported delinquency and victimisation surveys; juvenile delinquency; impact of penal crime control. He is a member of the editorial board of the journals Monatsschrift für Kriminologie and Neue Kriminalpolitik, a board-member of the German Society of Criminology, regional chair of the German Juvenile Justice Association and member of the ESC’s working groups on Development and Life-course Criminology (EDLC) and Organisational Crime (EUROC).

Professor Betsy Stanko is Assistant Director, Corporate Development, managing the development of Evidence and Performance for the Metropolitan Police Service. In her first life, she was a professor of criminology, teaching and researching at Clark University (USA), Brunel University, Cambridge University.
Dina Siegel is Professor of Criminology at Utrecht University, The Netherlands. She obtained her Ph.D. in cultural anthropology at the VU University of Amsterdam. She is a chair of the MA program ‘Global Criminology’. Her fields of interest are: post-Soviet organised crime; human trafficking; criminality in diamond sector; XTC smuggling and policy in Europe; women in organized crime; East and Central European criminal gangs in West Europe; cultural criminology and crime and music.

She is one of the founders of the Centre for Information and Research on Organised Crime (CIROC). In 2006–2012 she was President of IASOC (International Association for the Study of Organized Crime), ASC. She is a member of editorial board of Trends in Organized Crime; Crime, Law and Social Change; Crime, Media, Culture and Tijdschrift over Cultuur en Criminaliteit. In addition, she is a member of the Academic Board of two Ph.D. programs, the International Ph.D Program at the Universita Cattolica, Milan and that of the Cultural and Global Criminology (DCGC, Erasmus Program).

Anette Storgaard is an associate professor in criminology at the School of Law, University of Aarhus, Denmark. She is also a trained mediator. In the School of Law she is teaching national and international students criminology and mediation. Furthermore she is also involved in a diploma course in criminology.

Anette is the vice-chair of the Scandinavian Research Council for Criminology.

Since the very beginning of her academic career her research focus has been imprisonment and alternatives to imprisonment. She has carried out several studies focusing on, for instance, female convicts, drug addicts and long-term prisoners. Her research interest also includes juvenile justice and state responses to juvenile offending.

Currently she engaged in various European projects on Restorative Justice and Community Sanctions.

**INFORMATION ON THE ELECTION OF ESC OFFICIALS**

According to the Constitution of the ESC (Section 4), the Executive Board consists of elected and appointed members. The latter, which include the executive secretary, the editor of the newsletter, the editor of the European Journal of Criminology, and one representative of the organisers of the current and last annual meeting each, are not voting members. Elected members are the President, the Past President, the President-Elect, and two at-large Board members.

Executive Board Members are elected by the General Assembly (Section 3 of the ESC constitution). The President serves 3 years, one as President-Elect, one as President, one as Past-President; at-large Board members have a two year term.

Only those with an active membership in the ESC, and present, may participate in the election of Board members at the General Assembly. The General Assembly shall vote by the majority of those present.

In case there are more candidates than positions open to elections, only one vote shall take place, and the vote count shall decide. Candidates with the highest vote count shall take precedence until all the positions are filled. At the request of at least five members, votes and elections are to be held by secret ballot.

This year, as usual, the General Assembly will take place at the Annual Conference in Bilbao, on September 14th, 2012 (please consult the official program of the conference for the final schedule).

The 2012 General Assembly shall elect one person to the presidency, and two persons for at-large Board membership and one auditor.
CLARENDON STUDIES IN CRIMINOLOGY

Breaking Rules: The Social and Situational Dynamics of Young People’s Urban Crime

Per-Olof H. Wikström, FBA, Professor of Ecological and Developmental Criminology at the Institute of Criminology, University of Cambridge, and Professorial Fellow of Girton College, Dietrich Oberwittler, Senior Researcher / Research Group Leader, Max Planck Institute, Kyle Treiber, Research Associate (PADS+), and Beth Hardie, Research Manager (PADS+)

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