Susanne Karstedt: ESC European Criminology Award Acceptance Speech
Barry Goldson on Juvenile Justice in Europe
I am sure that you have all enjoyed this year’s European Society of Criminology conference in the beautiful city of Sarajevo. Once more, the conference was the perfect forum to meet each other and engage in the exchange of thoughts and ideas about what lives in criminology in Europe and beyond. I have found the Sarajevo conference particularly interesting because it brought us to a city and area in Europe that only some of us know or visit as criminologists. This new environment stimulated curiosity and encouraged the exploration of new perspectives. The conference attracted significant public attention and media coverage in the region. The headlines reflect that the conference was not seen as just another academic conference but was considered a milestone event in the region at which important societal issues and problems were addressed.

This reminds us that the ESC conference is much more than a group of academics and practitioners engaging with each other and meeting up in a bubble that is defined by what they think criminology is or should be. In his 2014 presidential address, former president Gerben Bruinsma acknowledged the success of the ESC, but also expressed his concern about the extent that the society’s members engage in ‘mutual discussion’. He argued that the existence of different schools of thought within criminology has many advantages in terms of communication and scientific development within these schools. Yet, he also pointed out the disadvantages of this evolution. The existence of parallel groups that are characterised by their distinct fields of study—in which the members prefer to publish in specialty journals, attend specialised conferences and engage in discussion with members of expert working groups—may lead to less mutual communication within criminology at large. Ultimately, this fuels stereotypes and prejudices about other schools and, sometimes, even (personal) animosity between members of different schools of thought.

I share Gerben Bruinsma’s concern. In support of my candidacy for the presidency, I have indicated that it is my ambition to further establish the ESC as an inclusive scientific society and strengthen its supportive role in fostering mutual communication and offering a forum to exchange thoughts. It is my conviction that our criminology society should be a critical society that is, however, open and supportive of cooperation, not only across country borders but also across borders of the mind. The ESC should continue to encourage its members to engage in critical discussions with each other regardless of its members’ epistemological or methodological preferences and irrespective of their status and age.

Though there is still much work to be done to secure this open and inclusive criminological society, I believe it is time to take the ESC’s ambition to establish itself as a principal forum one step further. Increasingly, criminology has become an established and respected discipline with strong specialised schools and sub disciplines. Criminologists conduct quality criminological
research; there are excellent criminological journals; and
conferences specific to criminology are held. This is a sign
that the discipline thrives but also holds a threat to crimi-
ology’s place within (social) science in general. When
criminologists begin to form an inward-looking group with
its own criteria, ideas and paradigms, oblivious of other
disciplines and fields of study, there is little room for out-
side input and anomalies.

Though criminology is interdisciplinary by its nature,
there is a challenge to keep it open and foster not only
mutual communication within criminology but also
between criminology and other disciplines. This mutual
communication is not just needed to keep criminology
open to what happens elsewhere but will also prove
crucial to open up our criminological work to other
disciplines. Indeed, we should not hope to think that the
answers for criminology’s leading questions simply lie
within the discipline. At the same time, it is equally im-
portant that we reach out to other disciplines and offer
our knowledge and expertise to address their leading
questions. In the end, however, it is not about ‘our’ and
‘their’ answers and questions but about answers and
questions that matter most to science and society.

Recent discussions at the level of the European Union
on the new Framework Programme of the EU ‘Horizon
Europe 2021–2027’ illustrate that openness towards other
disciplines and interdisciplinary research on societal is-
sues is all but evident. Different disciplines have different
claims about what matters in science and society. But the
power to attract attention to, and ultimately secure fund-
ing for, the kind of answers that a discipline can provide
differs considerably. In the proposed pillar on the global
challenges that the European Union wants to address,
there is a disagreement on whether the cluster ‘inclusive
and secure societies’ should be considered (read: fund-
ed) as one cluster or, instead, should be treated as two
separate clusters. The former scenario would have social
scientists negotiate a precarious position in collaborations
and sometimes even be in direct competition with so-
called ‘hard’ scientists. This scenario entails a risk that the
role of social scientists in research addressing these chal-
lenges remains marginal, as has often been the case so
far. The latter scenario, in which a choice would be made
to separate research on inclusive societies from research
on secure societies, would allow the first research line to
be tailored more to social sciences and the latter to hard
sciences. The result would probably be greater visibility
and more funding success for social sciences. But it is
my opinion that this would come at a great price, as it
would also reinstall artificial borders in scientific activity,
foster competition between disciplines, and allow differ-
ent schools of thought to thrive at the expense of mutual
communication within and between disciplines.

I believe this is a matter that should be addressed
by the ESC as well. Keeping criminology strong and rel-
levant implies that we cherish and foster the dialogue and
knowledge exchange between all criminologists. Impor-
tantly, it also entails that criminologists remain open-
minded about what happens beyond what are considered
the borders of criminology. In the end, this crossing of
borders and migration of ideas will make criminology
stronger and increase the potential for our involvement
in interdisciplinary research about scientific and societal
issues that matter most.

In 2014 Gerben Bruinsma called upon that year’s
conference participants to attend at least one session on
a topic that they were unfamiliar with. In an effort to sup-
port this initiative, he organised a number of presidential
sessions in which a new generation of criminologists
from different schools of thought presented their views
on the future development of criminology. Four years
later, I want to repeat that call and expand it. I would
like to urge you to participate in sessions that appear to
be out of your comfort zone at the 2019 Ghent confer-
cence. Importantly, I empathically encourage you to look
beyond criminology. For that reason, I have asked the local
organisers of the 2019 Ghent conference to dedicate one
plenary session of the conference to a dialogue between
criminology and other scientific disciplines. This will
prove to be an interesting plenary in which non-criminol-
ogists deliver their view on criminology. I hope to see you
all there.

Tom Vander Beken is President of the ESC, Full Profes-
sor at the Department of Criminology, Criminal Law and
Social Law and director of the Institute for International
Research on Criminal Policy (IRCP), both at Ghent
University.

FROM THE NEXT ISSUE

› Obituary for Sophie Body-Gendrot and Kauko Aromaa
› Discussion: The Criminology of Radicalisation
It is a great honour for me to be the recipient of the 2018 ESC European Criminology Award for Lifetime Contribution to European Criminology. I feel that Sarajevo is a very special place to share this moment with my colleagues from all over Europe. I would like to express my gratitude to the Award Committee for their work, and to Michael Levi for his laudation and his very kind words on my contribution to comparative, cross-national and cross-cultural research in criminology. I owe a huge debt of gratitude to the many colleagues and friends whose support and encouragement, insights and teaching helped and inspired my research across continents. Just to mention one from a long list, 2016 award winner Jan van Dijk and his book The World of Crime (2008) are a wonderful source of inspiration.

It seems quite natural that a peripatetic academic like me focuses her research on comparative perspectives and aims at making a contribution to our understanding of the differences between societies and countries. What we have in common, where we differ and how we can learn from each other are big questions for European criminology and criminologists. Addressing them will build a distinctive European perspective on crime and justice policies. In my research I am trying to find answers to: Why do societies in Europe and across the world differ in levels of violence, state violence or corruption? What are the institutional and cultural roots of these differences? What can we do to improve criminal justice, in particular conditions in prisons?

I believe in the value of comparative research, not only at the macro-level of societies, but also at the level of regions or cities. Combining different levels in comparative perspectives, using different ‘scales’, thinking across different domains and transporting insights from crime prevention at neighbourhood level up to the level of societies and vice versa, I believe, will greatly enhance the comparative enterprise (Karstedt 2017a). I also believe that we need to enhance comparative theorising and research across criminology’s domains by thinking across disciplinary boundaries in order to fully exploit its potential.

INTRODUCING ‘BIG PICTURE’ CRIMINOLOGY

Presently, comparative research is mainly identified with the ‘big picture’ in criminological thinking, theorising and research—a term coined by Richard Rosenfeld in his presidential address to the ASC (2011). It is thus identified with explanations of crime levels and criminal justice practices rather than with figuring out how to reduce crime and improving justice. For many criminologists, it epitomises criminology as a ‘descriptive and observational science’ (Sherman quoted in Leigh 2018, 91). Lawrence Sherman compares this type of criminology to astronomy, and proposes that criminology move to the experimental and medical model of science (ibid). Notwithstanding many successful (quasi-)experimental approaches in astronomy, the question arises whether ‘Big Picture Criminology’ can be as useful as experimental designs and Random Controlled Trials in addressing pressing crime and justice problems across the globe, and deliver the tools for preventing violence or corruption, or improving prison conditions.

However, not dissimilar to astronomy, comparative criminology has the potential to question established worldviews and theories that are taken for granted. One such assumption is that ‘the rich get richer and the poor get prison’, established in manifold theoretical and empirical accounts on the relationship between inequality and imprisonment: the more unequal a society is, the higher is the number of prisoners and rate of incarceration (Wilkinson & Pickett 2009). When testing this with different measures of inequality, I found that it is neither true on a global scale with nearly 150 countries included, nor on a regional scale or for certain groups of countries. There is no significant relationship between a number of different measures of inequality and imprisonment rates, neither for the rich OECD countries, nor for the poorer regions of the world. In contrast, in Latin American countries inequality has decreased substantively over the past decades, while imprisonment rates shot up (Karstedt 2017b). In comparative research on trust in police and justice, I found that
democracies do not outperform other regime types, and that they did not differ significantly from authoritarian regimes, even after controlling for violence, corruption and state violence (Karstedt 2013a). Such results should give reason for probing questions on what we tend to take for granted.

Big picture criminology has been criticised for just that, being the ‘big picture’, over-generalising and under-estimating difference. Political scientist Alasdair MacIntyre (1978, 260) expressed these doubts some time ago:

There was once a man who aspired to be the author of the general theory of holes. When asked ‘what kind of hole—holes dug into the sand by children or gardeners to plant seedlings’, he would reply that he wished for a general theory of holes. Lacking explanations to which he originally aspired he then fell for significant correlations … he found a correlation between the aggregate hole digging achievement of a society and its degree of technological development.

The US surpasses Upper Volta in hole digging; there are more holes in Vietnam than there were. … Had he concerned himself not with holes but with modernization, urbanization or violence …

Certainly, there are some truths in this acerbic satirical comment that can easily be applied to ‘big picture criminology’, and it raises necessary and useful doubts about its value. However, such doubts have thwarted a serious exploration into the potential of comparative research for evidence-based policy in our field, where it has remained under-explored and under-valued, and neglected as a valid source for crime and justice policies. The policy relevance of ‘big picture criminology’ is far from being accepted in our field, not to speak of being put to good use for crime prevention and improvements of justice.

In contrast, in political science, health or development economics, comparative research is seen as a foundation for evidence-based policies, and its policy relevance is not disputed (Stoker, Peters & Pierre 2015). Early on, political scientists asked whether

‘comparison can be regarded as the social scientist’s equivalent of the natural scientist’s laboratory’ and ‘the comparative method … an adequate substitute for experimentation …?’ (Lijphart 1971, 971).

The answer to this was that comparison was only an imperfect substitute, but its limitations were not necessarily disabling for the purpose (Lijphart, ibid). Today, the UN and World Bank, as well as NGOs, extensively use comparative methods in their influential reports and in policy making (e.g. World Bank 2015; 2017; Leigh 2018, 146). Themes range widely: from the prevention of coups (message: restrain your military), to the role of women’s education in children’s mortality, from levels of corruption for health outcomes for mothers and children to health effects of the rule of law. We find numerous examples where such comparative studies have questioned existing policies of development and aid, and shifted the flow of investment towards what was seen as more effective.

I am confident that we can do the same in criminology, and I will explore this in three steps, starting with promises and limitations of comparative research; I go on asking what we can learn from political science, and finally align big and small pictures in criminology.

MOVING TOWARD POLICY RELEVANCE

Promises and limitations

Comparative criminologists see a ‘natural laboratory’ existing among the societies and governments of nearly 200 countries today. These laboratories are even more numerous if we include sub-national governments and spaces (Baumer & Wolff 2014). Each government and society level might be seen as a quasi-experiment of sorts, and together they provide an immense and incredibly rich data set for exploring what works, what does not and what is promising. Presently, urban spaces and local governments emerge as one of the most promising natural laboratories from which to learn. Comparative research on city spaces and municipal crime prevention policies provide encouraging results, as, for example, can be seen in many Latin American cities (de Mello & Schneider 2010; World Bank 2011). Both Bogota and Recife experienced an unexpected drop in violence within a national and regional context of high levels of violence. Crime reduction policies at the municipal level included data systems for targeting policing (e.g. a data base of violent offenders; anonymous crime reporting hotline), training police in Human Rights, training citizens on security issues, and permanent police operation in drug trafficking areas (Mello & Schneider 2010; Hoelscher & Nussio 2016).

As comparative criminology goes ‘experimental’, its basic logic follows the experimental approach. However, there are limitations to comparative criminology as equivalent to ground-level experimental approaches and what it can achieve for evidence-based policy. The three types of limitations include a) the (non-)manipulability of variables (Peters 2015, 182), b) the ‘longue durée’ of impact and c) simultaneous and non-simultaneous trends.

One of the major factors affecting the relevance of comparative criminology as evidence base is the fact...
that a large number of variables that are used in comparative research are not easily manipulable, or not at all, and here it actually looks like astronomy. There are numerous examples in our field. For example, levels of inequality are good predictors of violence measured in homicide rates (Nivette 2011). However, inequality can hardly be manipulated. Similarly, trust between people is an important cultural and social resource of societies, closely related to violence and crime; however, it is hardly a societal characteristic that lends itself to easy change by policy. My own research (Karstedt 2015) shows that cultural values like egalitarianism and individualism both correspond to lower homicide rates. I found that societies with strong cultural values of individualism and individu-
alistic orientations have lower rates of lethal violence than collectivistic ones. Similarly, egalitarian values and orientations coincide with lower levels of lethal violence. Both types of cultural orientations differ between countries and change over time (see e.g. Pinker 2011 for similar changes); however, as deeply embedded cultural conditions of societies, they do not lend themselves to short-term manipulation by policies.

Time is another major limitation for the policy relevance of ‘big picture criminology’. For example, mid-19th century education levels still are one of the best predictors of corruption levels in a country (Lapuente & Rothstein 2014). That is a long time to wait for policy impact. Finally, change and trends do not always neatly coincide. Comparative analyses of crime and violence find that trends can take distinctly different directions between countries, regions and cities, and macro- and micro levels (Baumer & Wolff 2014). Even if (downward) trends are widely shared, driving factors often are not, as LaFree & McDowall (2015) found for the homicide rates in 55 countries. Learning from what drives crime rates down in one place and translate it into policy-relevant strategies in another one is a complex matter.

Learning from political science

When political scientists developed a new understanding of the relevance of comparative research for evidence-based policy, they started with a new orientation. They turned to understanding what makes societies and governments more successful than others in achieving ‘outcomes for citizens’. Outcomes are defined as ‘overall human well-being’, and are measured by an array of indicators from ‘objective’ ones like poverty, child mortality, and other health indicators, to ‘subjective’ ones like life satisfaction, trust and security, or general perceptions of quality of life (Rothstein 2015). Political scientist Rothstein and his colleagues found that it is the quality of governance that makes the difference. Quality of government is indicated by the state’s administrative capacity, e.g. to collect taxes and distribute for the common good, to handle public finances in a responsible way, to control corruption and establish the rule of law. Bad governance measured in this way turned out to be a strong predictor of child deprivation in terms of poverty, safety, health and education for low and middle income countries (Halleroed, Rothstein & Daoud 2013). More generally, the quality of governance is related to overall health and life expectancy in the population of 180 countries, and corruption is a strong predictor of low levels of a healthy life expectancy (Holmberg & Rothstein 2011).

This is a most important lesson for criminologists and can be easily translated into our discipline. Both crime and justice are integral parts of the quality of governance: safe and just societies are not only indicators or outcomes of good governance; they also provide the conditions in which citizens live better and healthier lives. In my research on Nigeria I found that corruption and maternal mortality both declined concomitantly, indicating the relationship between good governance and health outcomes (Karstedt 2012). Similarly, Figure 1 shows that female life expectancy is lower in more violent societies.

What would quality of governance look like in criminology’s domain, i.e. in the criminal justice system? The rule of law is an essential indicator of good governance and includes legitimacy and efficiency of criminal justice. It is a broad ‘quality of government’ indicator for criminal justice systems. In contrast, state violence indicates bad governance, particularly in criminal justice as well as bad governments more generally. It includes extra-judicial killings, disappearances at the hands of criminal justice, torture and political imprisonment. My research shows that bad governance in and of criminal justice is related to higher levels of interpersonal violence (homicide rates), and thus makes citizens less safe from violence. As Figure 2 shows, this relationship is particularly strong for the rule of law.

Comparative criminologists should follow the model of political scientists when aiming for policy relevance. First, we should focus on the quality of governance in criminal justice at all levels and urban, regional and national government. Comparative research at all of these levels provides an evidence-base for crime and justice policies. Most important, the quality of criminal justice governance is (and always has been) subject to policy decisions.
Figure 1. Female Life expectancy and homicide 2006–2010. See Karstedt (2012) for more details

Figure 2. Quality of Criminal Justice: Rule of Law and Homicide 2005–2009. See Karstedt 2015 for details
Scaling criminology

‘Big picture criminology’ offers exceptional opportunities to put the small picture into the big one: We can test policies already validated in one setting in other national and cultural settings; we can link macro and individual level approaches, as e.g. in the prevention of violence. My suggestion is to make criminology multi- or inter-scalar, which implies crossing disciplinary and domain boundaries. I will demonstrate that evidence-based policies for crimes against humans can be scaled up to prevent crimes against humanity; and vice versa, evidence from comparative conflict and peace research can be scaled down to prevent crimes against humans in their neighbourhoods and cities.

 Violence is an exemplary case for ‘scaling criminology’ as I have described this approach (Karstedt 2017a). Patterns of street crime and situations of extreme violence like atrocity crimes have much in common. Both are highly concentrated in ‘hot spots’, they are contagious, and they spread to proximate areas through networks, violent peers and ‘bad’ neighbours. There are a number of evidence-based policies that can be scaled up from street crime to high-risk conflict zones. These include the principles of hot-spot policing, namely the focused and intermittent, non-permanent deployment of police to a small number of hot spots of violence; programmes to reduce gang violence; and the ‘dynamic concentration of deterrence’ and ‘lever-pulling policing’. Both latter strategies move interventions — be it police or security forces — to sequenced and dialogical ones. They are based on four principles: selective focusing and targeting different level and networks of actors; communication and dialogue including communities; future orientation of preventing violence rather than prosecuting past violence; and a broad and escalating range of intervening action.

 The concentration of resources and targets makes these practices particularly adaptive to an environment where control is contested, where the capacity of protective forces is low, and criminal justice agencies are institutionally weak. Public commitment to targeted and intensive enforcement focused on future crimes thus can support the monitoring of specific types of violence, or of a group of known and identified perpetrators. Concentration, selectivity and direct communication may address the major problem of credibility in creating security and deter violent action in conflict zones (Karstedt 2013b).

 In contrast to this ‘scaling up’, ‘scaling down’ implies using evidence from comparative conflict research on peace negotiations, peace building and conflict settlement for violence reduction and prevention in urban neighbourhoods and cities. This research has provided evidence that ceasefires, full or partial settlements are successful in more than half of the cases, and only a small minority fail completely. Violence significantly subsides before and after peace accords, and two thirds of peace agreements lead to stable solutions over time. If violence recurs, it mostly does at a lower level. As it turns out, mediation and negotiation are nearly always the best options to end violence (Karstedt 2017a). Importantly, this research demonstrates that such efforts at mediation need to be repeated. As in other areas we find that a one-shot intervention is mostly not enough. This is an important lesson for the local level and violence in neighbourhoods and cities. As evidence from Latin American cities shows, consistency across a prolonged time period is an important part of successful strategies (de Mello & Schneider 2010).

THE FUTURE OF ‘BIG PICTURE CRIMINOLOGY’

Comparative criminology has a huge potential for evidence-based policy that needs to be unlocked — empirically and methodologically. A focus on quality of governance in criminal justice opens up the route from descriptive and explanatory enterprise to becoming policy relevant. Big picture and comparative criminology are seminal in defining context, conditions and time lines for policies that make societies and communities more successful in reducing crime and promoting justice. Criminology has unique advantages when it comes to evidence on individual and local levels, and there is a wealth of evidence and evidence-based policies that can be explored for use on a larger scale and in different domains. ‘Small’ and ‘big’ picture criminology enhance each other in developing evidence-based policy. Comparative criminologists should feel encouraged to put the policy-relevance of their research to test.

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Halleroed B, Rothstein B & Daoud A (2013) Bad governance and
The word *laudatum* tends to evoke in me the phrase of Mark Anthony in *Julius Caesar* that ‘I come to bury Caesar, not to praise him; the evil that men do lives after them; the good is often interred with their bones—so let it be with Caesar’. But that is not the case here. Susanne is very clever, of course, as have been all the winners and unsuccessful candidates for this award. However cleverness is a necessary but not a sufficient virtue.

She is also adventurous and brave in her choices of subject and the methodologies she uses: atrocity crimes, legitimacy and the perception of ‘ordinary’ white-collar market offences are not normal interests for criminologists in any country. And she has applied to them a broad array of methodologies that might be applied elsewhere but are seldom found in combination: historical and archival work, oral histories, and advanced statistical methods including public opinion surveys. These choices are made out of a holistic rigour of thinking and desire to destruction-test evidence and arguments, not in a narrow ‘crime science’ sense, but in a creative approach to examining the robustness of conclusions. *This is not a recipe for popularity*. Some here do not favour one or any of these techniques, and none of us likes to be criticised. As a graduate student, my own intellectual mentor Richard F. Sparks went through the statistical analysis of the Gluecks and of Nigel Walker and ripped them apart. He did this also on the staff at Cambridge and Rutgers. This was not a comfortable experience for his colleagues. But what doesn’t kill you makes you stronger, and as Susanne memorably said in an ASC Authors Meet Critics session when critiquing Jock Young’s ridiculing of quant criminology, ‘Your methodology is the only one that cannot be proved wrong’.

Susanne Karstedt is a scholar who has taught and researched in her native Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Belgium, and is now based in Australia at Griffith University. As she wrote recently in the ESC Newsletter, she sees her intellectual roots both in Europe and the United States (as many of us wrinklies or—if you want to be more polite—no longer so young criminologists do).

The European/global component of her scholarship is illustrated also by her chosen field of research: international comparative studies across a broad range of crime and justice problems. Her work in this area has fertilised research on the role of democratic values and institutions in crime and justice. This has a wide span unusual in our current specialisation culture: it includes violence and corruption, trust and confidence in criminal justice, as well as imprisonment and prison conditions. She is a keen explorer of new fields of enquiry, to which she always brings the instruments of quantitative empirical research, designing new indicators of extreme violence or creating a global measurement of prison conditions, in addition to a keen interest in theory rather than in empiricism for its own sake.

She has engaged with the history and traditions of Europe in two main ways. Since 1990, she has researched and published on transitional societies in Europe and across the globe, their problems and crises, and how these are reflected in both the forms of crime and the problems of justice. More recently this has foregrounded publications on state crime and atrocities, and the transitional justice mechanisms to deal with these. Though anchored in the post-war history of Germany, her analysis of public opinion, denial and acknowledgment, the experiences of victims, and the reputation and subsequent careers of sentenced Nazi War Criminals in Post-War Germany holds a number of lessons for contemporary international criminal justice as well as for transitional justice. She has, for example, worked together with Chrisje Brants on a special issue on ‘After Justice’ for sentenced war criminals, as well as on the public sphere of transitional justice. She has explored the unique European experience of ‘state crime’ across the past century, and the leading role of Europe in addressing and preventing atrocity crimes.

She therefore (still) sees Europe as a ‘normative power’, as she said in her keynote at the European Criminology Conference in Budapest in 2013, in particular in the area of criminal justice and punishment. Her body of empirical and cross-national comparative research on democratic and solidarity values as developed (and increasingly often trampled upon) in Europe demonstrates their role in shaping imprisonment and prison conditions, as well as criminal justice generally.

She sees a prominent role for institution-building in transitional processes and through transitional justice mechanisms, and explores both its successes and shortcomings in curbing state crime in Europe and in post-conflict societies globally. This is part of her commitment to Popperian falsifiability *wherever such methods make sense*: but she does not adhere blindly to ‘quant methods’ in the atheoretical way that is commonplace in some criminological arenas.

Since the early 2000s, she has been avant-garde in developing a line of research on emotions and criminal
I have witnessed her formidable work ethic and commitment to rigour in the course of co-editing two special issues of the British Journal of Criminology: on white-collar crime (2006) and on terrorism (2010). Her insistence on confronting the complexity of issues and rejecting simple ideological tropes was very evident, though of course the demand for excellence always leaves its ‘collateral damage’, however charmingly criticisms are expressed.

Susanne sees criminology as properly being genuinely engaged with moral decisions, and this morality is (implicitly or explicitly) part of decision-making by individuals, groups and within institutions. For her, the conflict between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ functions inside of culture as an internal dynamic. Crime, social control and criminal justice become expressions of these internal dynamics, and they can be seen as illuminating both culture and society.

Comparing is thus a core business of criminology, and this leitmotif runs throughout her scholarly contributions. This is a very challenging analytical task, especially when rigorous empirical work is a necessary component of this for its intellectual credibility. To have managed this while living a peripatetic scholarly life in two distant continents (and, like most of the previous winners of this award, writing and presenting in a non-native language) is an impressive feat, and makes her a worthy recipient of the ESC’s European Criminology Award.

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Barry Goldson

**JUVENILE JUSTICE IN A CHANGING EUROPE**

Any notion that there is a distinctive pan-European approach to juvenile justice is a fallacy. Having completed an ambitious and detailed survey of 34 European jurisdictions, for example, Dünkel (2015: 49) reflects that ‘juvenile justice systems in Europe have developed in various forms and with different orientations’. He further observes that

‘in the past 25 years, [juvenile] justice systems in Europe have undergone considerable changes ... [and] differing and sometimes contradictory [juvenile] justice policies have also emerged’ (ibid: 9).

The ‘differing’ and ‘contradictory’ nature of juvenile justice policies might, at the most fundamental level, be conceptualized as the embodiment of tensions between a human-rights-centred ‘child-friendly justice’ on one hand, and a harsher and more punitive penality on the other. It is certainly true that the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers has adopted specific ‘Guidelines for Child Friendly Justice’ that are intended to

‘achieve a greater unity between the [47] member states ... [and] ensure the effective implementation of ... binding universal and European standards protecting and promoting children’s rights’ (Council of Europe, 2010: Preamble).

Stalford (2012: 1) has also drawn attention to parallel developments within the European Commission and the 28 Member states of the European Union (EU). But in stark contrast, Bailleau et al. (2010: 13) have argued that a

‘weakening of the founding principles of juvenile justice’ is evident in the ‘majority of countries in Europe’ where ‘social intolerance ... is rising against a backdrop of a drift to hard-line law-and-order policies and practices’ (ibid: 7–8).

Such totalizing pan-European or transnational narratives shine a light on the tensions and contradictions embodied within juvenile justice in Europe, but they are also intrinsically flawed, and more nuanced international and intra-national analyses are necessary.

At the international level of analysis two key indicators of difference are especially noteworthy: the minimum age of criminal responsibility (the entry point at the ‘front end’ or the ‘shallow end’ of juvenile justice systems) and the recorded rates of penal detention (at the ‘back end’ or the ‘deep end’ of the same systems). The most obvious point to make pertaining to the minimum age of criminal responsibility across the 47 Member states of the Council of Europe is that it extends from 10 years (in Switzerland and in two of the UK jurisdictions—England and Wales and Northern Ireland), to 18 years (in Belgium). The minimum age of criminal responsibility stands at 14 years in most of the Member states, but 10 countries ‘responsibilise’ children below the age of 14 years and 11 jurisdictions refrain from imposing such responsibility until children reach the age of 15 years or beyond (Goldson, 2019: 223–224). If we shift attention to recorded rates of penal detention within the 28 Member States of the European Union, similar diversity is apparent. Indeed, the recorded rates of penal detention for children and young people aged 17 years or under, extend from less than 1:100,000 (in Sweden) to 44:100,000 (in Poland). At face value, Member States in the West and North of Europe appear to be less inclined to hold children and young people in penal detention than their neighbouring States in the South and East of Europe. But closer analysis reveals that the picture is more complicated than this might otherwise imply and there are also both relatively low and high rates of penal detention to be found within each of the regions of Europe: North, South, East and West (Goldson 2019: 224).

In this way, fixing the analytical gaze at the international level reveals significant disparities across juvenile justice...
systems in Europe. But it also tends to conceal intra-national or sub-national differences and, as Christiaens (2015: 11) observes, ‘no model [of juvenile justice] remains completely pure’ in its translation, implementation and practical operationalisation. Ultimately, it is only by adopting a sub-national ‘area studies’ (Nelken, 2017: 428) approach that we might begin to understand how national juvenile justice policy is ‘visioned and reworked (or made to work) by those “on the ground”’ (Muncie, 2015: 383), or how ‘top-down national policies are necessarily mediated and filtered from below’ (Goldson 2019: 229).

So, comprehending the diverse and divergent nature of contemporary juvenile justice in Europe is a complex exercise. Furthermore, juvenile justice is never fixed or static and current transformational shifts in European political economies present additional challenges that will necessitate further change.

Indeed, if post-war welfare state settlements—in Western Europe at least—were underpinned by support for a relatively high standard of social provision and sustained by a ‘politics of social solidarity’ (Baldwin, 1990), more recent social, economic and political developments appear to signify the incremental weakening and undermining of such consensual solidarities. Economic globalisation, demographic changes, shifts in family structures and formations, contracting labour market opportunities, greater job insecurity, casualisation and precarity (especially for the least well-paid) and widening and deepening inequalities in the distribution of income and wealth have consolidated (Piketty, 2014). Of course, the precise nature, pace and impact of such changing conditions—that are serving to disrupt welfare state settlements—vary across European countries and regions, but their overall effects have been generally deleterious. As Taylor-Goooby et al. (2017: 8–9) note

‘the structures that previously sustained the various welfare systems … are being dismantled [and] there is considerable uncertainty as to the form of welfare state that will emerge, or whether a transition to a different political economy with weaker provision for the most vulnerable … is under way’.

The reformulation of welfare settlements and related processes of welfare state retrenchment are obviously impacting upon children and young people; a ‘generation that will remember the crash of 2008 most acutely’ (Ballas et al. 2014: 65), even a ‘lost generation’ (Malik, 2012: 13). Data derived and collated from various European Commission sources reveal that in 2013, 11.6% of all young people aged 15–19 years who were living in the European Union were enduring ‘severe material deprivation’ and, by 2016, 30.1% were deemed to be ‘at risk of poverty and social exclusion’ (Goldson, 2019: 235). Such EU-wide averages conceal striking disparities between countries and regions but, overall, poverty rates are high in an otherwise ‘rich continent’ (Atkinson et al. 2017: 47).

Growing rates of youth unemployment are also deeply problematic. At the European Union level, the average rate of youth (15–19 years) unemployment across the 28 Member States at the beginning of 2016, stood at 21.8% (Goldson, 2019: 236)—just over 2% higher than the corresponding rate in 2008 (19.7%) (European Commission, 2017). Again, the European Union-wide average conceals disparities between countries and regions. For example, the youth unemployment rate ranges from a low of 7.3% (in Germany) to a high of 60.6% per cent (in Spain). In 7 countries (Austria, Denmark, Germany, Latvia, Malta, the Netherlands and Slovenia) fewer than 2 in 10 young people are recorded as unemployed, whereas in 6 countries (Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Spain and Slovakìa) the rate ranges between 4 in 10 and 6 in 10 (Goldson, 2019: 236).

High rates of youth unemployment in Europe are accompanied by equally high numbers of children and young people who are institutionally excluded from education and training programmes. Indeed, according to the European Commission (2015: 3–4) approximately 13.7 million young people ‘are neither in employment nor education or training (NEETs)’ and such young people tend to ‘have less trust in public institutions and participate less in social and civic activities than their peers’.

Such adverse conditions co-exist with unprecedented levels of migration. Throughout history, migration(s) has/have enriched Europe in innumerable ways; culturally, socially, economically. But current patterns of migration and immigration are not only assuming unprecedented levels but are also occurring at precisely the same time that welfare state retrenchment and conditions of austerity, family poverty, youth unemployment and NEET status are escalating. In the summer of 2015 alone, 1.5 million refugees arrived at Europe’s borders and, in the same year, 1.3 million people applied for asylum in Norway, Switzerland and the 28 European Union Member States (Tyler, 2017).

At a global level, approximately 50% (or 30 million) of the world’s involuntarily displaced people—including refugees, asylum seekers and internally displaced persons—are children (United Nations Secretary General, 2016: para. 18). At a European level, ‘the current refugee crisis is the greatest humanitarian challenge to have faced the European Union since its foundation [and] in 2015 88,245 unaccompanied children applied for asylum in the EU’ (House of Lords European Union Committee, 2016: 3).
Unaccompanied child migrants comprise a profoundly vulnerable group who have often experienced separation from their parents, caregivers and families; traumatic episodes in their countries of origin; irregular and dangerous migration routes and deeply adversarial conditions in countries of transit/transition (Pisani, 2019). Perhaps more telling, however, ‘is the fact that when unaccompanied migrant children arrive in the EU, they [often] face suspicion and disbelief’ (House of Lords European Union Committee, 2016: para. 2). Against this backdrop, Europol estimates that at least 10,000 unaccompanied minors are now ‘missing’ in the European Union and are potentially victims of sexual exploitation, trafficking or other criminal activity (ibid: para 3). Other processes of criminalisation are also at work and accompanied or unaccompanied, all children travelling without official documents, whether seeking work and ‘accompanied or unaccompanied, all children are at risk of being detained, given that in many countries illegal entry and illegal residence are considered as criminal offences’ (Sykiotou, 2017: 9).

Diminishing welfare states, chronic social exclusion, poverty unemployment, NEET status, deep-cutting and wide-ranging austerity measures, patterns of forced migration and the prospect of exploitation, trafficking and detention. Taken together, these are the conditions that currently confront millions of young Europeans. The same conditions also create social and economic environments that are known to give rise to juvenile crime and the disproportionate criminalisation of identifiable groups of children and young people. To put it another way, current changes in European political economies raise big questions of, and pose serious challenges for, the protectionist principles that have historically defined welfare states and juvenile justice systems in Europe.

Going forward, juvenile justice systems in Europe will need to address and reconcile the challenges presented by the macro-level social, economic and political conditions of late-modernity. And we know that Europe is not a monolithic or homogeneous entity and the formidable challenges currently confronting her constituent nation-states are distributed unevenly and are experienced with varying levels of gravity. It seems likely, for example, that some countries (in the South and East) will endure more prolonged and intense hostile conditions than others (in the North and West), possibly giving rise to a spectrum of differentiated responses. But although such responses will almost certainly be structurally related they will not necessarily be structurally determined. As Garland (2001: 201–202) has observed, ‘the same structural co-ordinates can support quite different political and cultural arrangements’. In other words, the future(s) of juvenile justice systems in Europe are not pre-ordained and the manner in which they respond to changing conditions will be made, shaped and formed by choices, the exercise of individual and collective agency and particularized political and professional adaptations.

So, the future shape and form of juvenile justice in Europe? Any attempt to prophesize detailed specificities is necessarily hampered by the uncertainties, contingencies, complexities and challenges that operate at each of the pan-European/transnational, international and intra-national/sub-national levels that are signaled above. That said, if reforms and adaptations take account of accumulated knowledge, evidence and experience, the combined effect will be to construct approaches that: foster social cohesion and facilitate informal mechanisms of social control (commanding trust and enjoying legitimacy) (Lappi-Seppälä, 2012); limit criminalizing modes of intervention by maximizing diversion (and community support) (McAra and McVie, 2019); and, ultimately, avoid the calamitous practices of child and youth imprisonment (Goldson, 2019). But it could also look very different.

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Nicolas Carr and Ester Blay

COMMUNITY SANCTIONS AND MEASURES WORKING GROUP

The Community Sanctions and Measures Working Group remains active and the membership continues to grow. In April 2018 we organised a meeting of the Working Group at the Institute for Criminal Law and Criminology, University of Vienna, where members presented on current research in areas including: pre-trial and pre-sentence measures; practices of offender supervision, enforcement and Access to Justice. We also held an ‘authors meet critics’ session at this meeting for a book emerging from the COST Action on Offender Supervision in Europe (IS1106). We organised five panels at the ESC Annual conference in Sarajevo in September 2018 on topics including: parole and prison release; professional decision-making, community sanctions in context and probation privatisation. Working group members are involved in a range of collaborative projects including editing a special issue of the European Journal of Probation. Our next working group meeting will be held at the Institute of Criminology, University of Cambridge in March 2019. The Working Group hosts a blog providing information on its activities including past and future events: https://communitysanctionsblog.wordpress.com

Anyone interested in joining the group is welcome to contact the Working Group co-chairs: nicola.carr@nottingham.ac.uk and ester.blay@udg.edu for further details.

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Since its founding in 2006 the European working group on Developmental and Life-Course Criminology, or EDLC for short, has witnessed criminology fully embrace the life-course paradigm, with the subsequent formation of the Division of Developmental and Life-Course Criminology of the American Society of Criminology in 2012, and the launch of the Journal of Developmental and Life-Course Criminology in 2015, as tell-tale signs of its growing importance to the field.

The growing popularity of the life-course paradigm inevitably led to diversification, with working groups forming around specific topics, that can be considered ‘life-course’ in the broad sense—or at least can be used to address life-course issues—, ranging from longitudinal quantitative methodology and the effects of formal sanctions, to narrative analysis. We applaud this divergence and interpret it as a sign of the vitality of the overarching life-course approach.

Over the years, the EDLC has been a stable presence during the annual ESC meetings, hosting sessions on specific life-course topics. From the growing network of researchers participating in these sessions sprang the Routledge International Handbook of Life-Course Criminology, in which we aimed to cover the broad spectrum of life-course topics European researchers were working on. The Handbook also included theoretical and empirical contributions from life-course criminologists from outside Europe, not only to show the full breadth of the extant research, but also to provide the opportunity for both parties to showcase their work abroad. The EDLC has also been involved in organizing workshops and symposia on specific topics, introducing the life-course perspective in for example to sex offender studies and corporate crime research.

As organizing thematic life-course sessions during the annual ESC meetings has proven an effective way to build and maintain a network of like-minded researchers, we will continue to do so. In the near future we also hope to intensify our collaboration with the ASC Division of Developmental and Life-Course Criminology, to further stimulate collaboration between European and American researchers. In the meantime we are contemplating what could be a next logical step to promote European life-course research. Another edited volume? A special journal issue? Or perhaps even a joint research project? If you have strong feelings on either one of these topics, want to suggest something completely different, or would like the EDLC to assist in organizing an event of your own, do not hesitate to send us a message.

As of January 2019 the EDLC is co-chaired by Victor van der Geest, VU University Amsterdam, The Netherlands (v.vander.geest@vu.nl) and Janna Verbruggen, Cardiff University, UK (verbruggenj@cardiff.ac.uk). Membership of the European working group on Developmental and Life-Course Criminology is free of charge. To join, please contact one of the chairs and you will be notified of any future events and publications the EDLC will be involved in.

Victor van der Geest is researcher at VU Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Janna Verbruggen is senior lecturer at Cardiff University, UK
Board Members and President: Nominations and Applications Sought

The nomination and application process for at-large board memberships and the presidency to be elected at the 2019 Annual Meeting in Ghent is now open. Members are encouraged to nominate others or apply themselves. Nominations and application shall be sent to the Executive Secretary by not later than 31st March 2019.